DIFFERENCES IN OPINION IN AN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKET EQUILIBRIUM

by Bernard Dumas, Karen Lewis and Emilio Osambela

Contribution

- To build a 2 country model with Differences of Opinion to study a set of well documented empirical regularities
 - ► Solve numerically a rich model
 - Positive results on: Home Bias, Two-factor CAPM, Returns and Capital Flows, "Abnormal" Cross-listing Returns

Model: Output processes

$$rac{d\delta_{i,t}}{\delta_{i,t}} = f_{i,t}dt + \sigma_{\delta}dZ_{i,t}^{\delta}$$

$$df_{i,t} = -\zeta \left(f_{i,t} - \overline{f}\right)dt + \sigma_{f}dZ_{i,t}^{f}, \ i = A, B$$

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Signals and Differences of Opinion

Domestic output:
$$ds_{i,t} = \phi dZ_{i,t}^f + \sqrt{1 - \phi^2 dZ_{i,t}^s}$$

Foreign output : $ds_{i,t} = dZ_{i,t}^s$, $i = A$, B

4 D > 4 B > 4 E > 4 E > 9 Q C

Model

Estimate/filter expected growth rates from observables

Domestic:
$$d\widehat{f}_{i,t}^{j} = -\zeta\left(\widehat{f}_{i,t}^{j} - \overline{f}\right)dt + \frac{\gamma_{i}^{-}}{\sigma_{\delta}^{2}}\left(\frac{d\delta_{i,t}}{\delta_{i,t}} - \widehat{f}_{i,t}^{j}dt\right) + \phi\sigma_{f}ds_{i,t}$$

Foreign:
$$d\widehat{f}_{i,t}^j = -\zeta\left(\widehat{f}_{i,t}^j - \overline{f}\right)dt + \frac{\gamma_i^{\neq}}{\sigma_{\delta}^2}\left(\frac{d\delta_{i,t}}{\delta_{i,t}} - \widehat{f}_{i,t}^j dt\right)$$

with variance of conditional expectation

$$\gamma^{\neq} > \gamma^{=}$$

4 D > 4 B > 4 E > 4 E > 9 Q C

Model

Change from probability B to A: "Sentiment Risk"

$$egin{aligned} rac{d\eta_t}{\eta_t} &= -rac{1}{\sigma_\delta^2} \left\{ egin{aligned} \left(\widehat{f}_{A,t}^B - \widehat{f}_{A,t}^A
ight) \left[rac{d\delta_{A,t}}{\delta_{A,t}} - \widehat{f}_{A,t}^B dt
ight] \ &+ \left(\widehat{f}_{B,t}^B - \widehat{f}_{B,t}^A
ight) \left[rac{d\delta_{B,t}}{\delta_{B,t}} - \widehat{f}_{B,t}^B dt
ight] \end{aligned}
ight\} \end{aligned}$$

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0

$$\eta_t \approx \frac{\text{probability}^A}{\text{probability}^B}$$

Model: Identical preferences and complete markets

Country B solves

$$\max_{c_B} E_0^B \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \frac{1}{\alpha} c_{B,t}^\alpha dt$$
s.t.
$$E_0^B \int_0^\infty \xi_t^B \left(c_{B,t} - \delta_{B,t} \right) dt \le 0$$

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Solution

$$c_{B,t} = \left(\lambda_B e^{
ho t} \xi_t^B
ight)^{-rac{1}{1-lpha}} \; ext{and} \; c_{A,t} = rac{oldsymbol{\eta}_t^{1-lpha}}{t} \left(\lambda_A e^{
ho t} \xi_t^B
ight)^{-rac{1}{1-lpha}}$$

Pricing measure

$$\xi_t^B = \mathrm{e}^{-
ho t} \left[\left(\frac{\eta_t}{\lambda^A} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-lpha}} + \left(\frac{1}{\lambda^B} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-lpha}} \right]^{1-lpha} \left(\delta_{A,t} + \delta_{B,t} \right)^{lpha-1}$$

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Next steps:

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- Next steps:
 - Implement allocation with 2 stocks, 2 futures contracts on signals and 1 risk free deposit
 - ► Solve for prices and portfolio strategies that finance optimal implied wealth process
- Sequential solution method makes this tractable

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- What is the difference?
- Advantages and disadvantages

Suggestion

Consider more basic models

$$rac{d\delta_{i,t}}{\delta_{i,t}} = f_{i,t}dt + \sigma_{\delta}dZ_{i,t}^{\delta}$$


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Home Bias: Findings

Share of foreign stocks held by domestic investors (Z)



Home Bias: Comments and Questions

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- Relatively weak effect. The example assumes $\phi=.95$, implying that 90% of signal variance is useful information, and 10% is noise
- What drives this result ?
- Can home bias ever become a foreign bias ?

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- Under Econometrician's measure, the two CAPMs hold equally well

$$\widehat{\mu}_{S_i}^E - r = (1 - \alpha) cov\left(\frac{dS_i}{S_i}, \frac{dc_A}{c_A}\right) - cov\left(\frac{dS_i}{S_i}, \frac{d\widetilde{\eta}_A}{\eta_A}\right); i = A, B$$

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 Interpretation: "One being national and the other a world factor"

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This two-factor model holds too:

$$\widehat{\mu}_{S_i}^E - r =$$

$$(1-\alpha)\cos\left(\frac{dS_i}{S_i},\frac{d(c_A+c_B)}{c_A+c_B}\right)-\cos\left(\frac{dS_i}{S_i},\frac{c_A}{c_A+c_B}\frac{d\widetilde{\eta}_A}{\eta_A}+\frac{c_B}{c_A+c_B}\frac{d\widetilde{\eta}_B}{\eta_B}\right)$$

$$i = A, B,$$

but both factors seem global

Model without frictions also has 3 CAPMs

$$\mu_{S_{i}} - r = (1 - \alpha) \cos \left(\frac{dS_{i}}{S_{i}}, \frac{dc_{A}}{c_{A}}\right); i = A, B$$

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$$\mu_{S_{i}} - r = (1 - \alpha) \cos \left(\frac{dS_{i}}{S_{i}}, \frac{d(c_{A} + c_{B})}{c_{A} + c_{B}}\right); i = A, B$$

the model implies that consumption is perfectly correlated across countries

Overall

- Very interesting paper!
- I would like a more systematic quantitative evaluation, maybe with a more basic model version