

China's Financial System: Past, Present, and Future^{*}

Franklin Allen

Finance Department
The Wharton School
University of Pennsylvania
allenf@wharton.upenn.edu

Jun “QJ” Qian[†]

Finance Department
Carroll School of Management
Boston College
qianju@bc.edu

Meijun Qian

Finance Department
NUS Business School
National University of Singapore
bizqmj@nus.edu.sg

Last Revised: March 28, 2007

(Forthcoming in the book “China's Great Economic Transformation,” edited by T. Rawski and L. Brandt, and published by the Cambridge University Press in 2007.)

Abstract

We examine the role of China's financial system in supporting economic growth, and explore directions of future development. First, the current financial system is dominated by a large but inefficient banking sector. Reducing the amount of non-performing loans among the major banks to normal levels is the most critical task for reforming the financial system in the short run. Second, the role of the stock market in allocating resources in the economy has been limited and ineffective. Further development of China's financial markets is the most important task in the long-term. Third, the most successful part of the financial system, in terms of supporting the growth of the overall economy, is a non-standard sector that consists of alternative financing channels, governance mechanisms, and institutions. This sector should co-exist with banks and markets in the future in order to continue to support the growth of the Hybrid Sector (non-state, non-listed firms). Finally, in order to sustain stable economic growth, China should aim to prevent and halt damaging financial crises, including a banking sector crisis, a real estate or stock market crash, and a “twin crisis” in the currency market and banking sector.

JEL Classifications: O5, K0, G2.

Keywords: banks, non-performing loans, markets, corporate governance, hybrid sector, financial crisis.

^{*} We appreciate suggestions from Loren Brandt and Thomas Rawski (co-editors) and other contributors to the book “China's Great Economic Transformation” that significantly improved the paper. We also wish to thank Dong Chen, Don Clarke, Ed Kane, Nick Lardy, Anthony Neoh, Katharina Pistor, Phil Strahan, Mengxin Zhao, and seminar/session participants at Baruch College, Columbia Law School, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, UC-Berkeley Law School, Penn Law School, York University and the 2006 Chinese Finance Association meetings for their comments, Jason Mao, Ying Xia, and Jason Xu for research assistance, and Michael Chui and Richard Herring for providing data on financial intermediaries and bond markets. Financial support from Boston College, the Smith Richardson Foundation, Wharton Financial Institutions Center and China International Capital Corp., Ltd. (for sponsoring the best paper award at the Chinese Finance Association meetings) is gratefully acknowledged. The authors are responsible for remaining errors.

[†] Corresponding author: Finance Department, Carroll School of Management, Boston College, MA 02467. Phone: 617-552-3145, fax: 617-552-0431, E-mail: qianju@bc.edu.

I. Introduction

We examine the role of China's financial system in supporting the growth of its economy and explore the directions of its future development. Almost every functioning financial system includes financial markets and intermediaries (e.g., a banking sector), but how these two sectors contribute to the entire financial system and economy differs significantly across different countries. Although there is no consensus regarding the prospects for China's future economic growth, a prevailing view on China's financial system speculates that it is one of the weakest links in the economy and it will hamper future economic growth.

A comprehensive examination of all aspects of China's financial system, and extensive comparisons with other countries where data is available are provided below. We also discuss what has worked and what remains to be done within the financial system, and examine how further development can better serve the entire economy. Finally, we provide guidelines for future research and policy making on several important unresolved issues, including how China's financial system should integrate into the world's markets and economy.

We draw four main conclusions about China's financial system and its future development. First, when we examine and compare China's banking system and financial markets with those of both developed and emerging countries, we find China's financial system is currently dominated by a large but under-developed banking system. Even with the entrance and growth of many domestic and foreign banks and financial institutions in recent years, China's banking system is still mainly controlled by the four largest state-owned banks with a large amount of non-performing loans (NPLs). Three of the 'big four' banks have recently become publicly listed and traded companies, with the government being the largest shareholder and retaining control. The continuing effort to improve the banking system, in particular, to reduce the amount of NPLs of the major banks to normal levels, is the most important aspect of reforming China's financial system in the short run.

Our second conclusion concerns China's financial markets. Two domestic stock exchanges, the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE hereafter) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE), were established in 1990. Their scale and importance are not comparable to the banking sector; and they have not been effective in allocating resources in the economy, in that they are highly speculative and driven by insider trading. Going forward, however, financial markets are likely to play an increasingly important role in the economy, and their further development is the most important long-term task for China's financial system. We propose several measures that can increase their size and scope and help to improve the efficiency of the markets.

Third, in a companion paper, Allen, Qian and Qian, (2005a, AQQ hereafter), we find that the most successful part of the financial system, in terms of supporting the growth of the overall economy, is not the banking sector or financial markets, but rather a sector of alternative financing channels, such as informal financial intermediaries, internal financing and trade credits, and coalitions of various forms among firms, investors, and local governments. Many of these financing channels rely on alternative governance mechanisms, such as competition in product and input markets, and trust, reputation and relationships. Together these mechanisms of financing and governance have supported the growth of a “Hybrid Sector” of non-state, non-listed firms with various types of ownership structures. It is important to point out at the outset that our definition of the Hybrid Sector is broader than privately or individually owned firms, which are only part of this sector. In particular, firms that are partially owned by *local* governments (e.g., Township Village Enterprises or TVEs) are also included in the Hybrid Sector. This is for two reasons. First, despite the ownership stake of local governments and the sometimes ambiguous ownership structure and property rights, the operation of these firms resembles more closely that of a for-profit, privately-owned firm than that of a state-owned firm. Second, the ownership stake of local governments in many of these firms has been privatized.¹ The growth of the Hybrid Sector has been much higher than that of the State Sector (state-owned enterprises or SOEs, and all firms where the central government has ultimate control) and the Listed Sector (publicly listed and traded firms with most of them converted from the State Sector), and contributes most of the economic growth. We believe these alternative channels and mechanisms should be encouraged going forward. They can co-exist with banks and markets while continuing to fuel the growth of the Hybrid Sector.

Finally, in our view a significant challenge for China’s financial system is to avoid damaging financial crises that can severely disrupt the economy and social stability. China needs to guard against traditional financial crises, including a banking sector crisis stemming from continuing accumulation of NPLs and a sudden drop in banks’ profits; or a crisis/crash resulting from speculative asset bubbles in the real estate market. China also needs to guard against new types of financial crises, such as a “twin crisis” (simultaneous foreign exchange and banking/stock market

¹ The Hybrid Sector comprises all the firms that are not state-owned or publicly listed, and more specifically, it includes the following types of firms: 1) privately owned companies (but *not* publicly listed and traded): controlling owners can be Chinese citizens, investors (or companies) from Taiwan or Hong Kong, or foreign investors (or companies); 2) collectively- and jointly-owned companies, where joint ownership among local government, communities, employees, and institutions is forged. See Li (1996) and Che and Qian (1998) for arguments on why an ambiguous ownership structure with local governments is more efficient than well-defined private property rights or state ownership in an environment with underdeveloped markets and institutions.

crises) that struck many Asian economies in the late 1990s. The entrance of China into the World Trade Organization (WTO) introduces cheap foreign capital and technology, but large scale and sudden capital flows and foreign speculation increase the likelihood of a twin crisis. At the end of 2006, China's foreign currency reserves surpassed US\$1 trillion, the largest in the world. The rapid increase in China's foreign exchange reserves suggests that there is a large amount of speculative money in China in anticipation of a continuing appreciation of the RMB, China's currency, relative to all other major currencies. Depending on how the government and the central bank handle the process of revaluation, there could be a classic currency crisis as the government and central bank try to defend the partial currency peg, which in turn may trigger a banking crisis if there are large withdrawals from banks.

The remaining sections are organized as follows. In Section II, we briefly review the history of China's financial system development, present aggregate evidence on China's financial system, and compare them to those of developed and other developing countries. In Section III, we examine China's banking system and the problem of NPLs and reforms. In Section IV, we examine the growth and irregularities of financial markets and listed firms. In Section V, we examine the non-standard financial sector, including alternative financial channels and governance mechanisms. We then examine different types of financial crises and how China's financial system can be better prepared for these crises in Section VI. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper. For simplicity, we use the exchange rate of US\$1 = RMB 8.28 (*yuan*) for transactions and events occurring before 2005, and US\$1 = RMB 8 (*yuan*) for those during and after 2005 throughout the chapter.

II. Overview of China's Financial System

In this section we examine China's financial system, focusing on both the banking system and financial markets, as well as firms' financing channels at the aggregate level, including non-bank and non-market channels.

II.1 A Brief Review of the History of China's Financial System

China's financial system was well developed before 1949.² One key finding in reviewing the history of this period, including the rise of Shanghai as one of the financial centers of Asia during the first half of the 20th Century, is that the development of China's commerce and financial system as a whole was by and large *outside* the formal legal system. For example, despite the entrance of

² We provide more descriptions of the pre-1949 history of China's financial system in a longer version of this paper (AQQ 2005b). For more anecdotal evidence on the development of China's financial system in the same period, see, for example, Kirby (1995) and Lee (1993).

Western-style courts in Shanghai and other major coastal cities in early 1900s, most business-related disputes were resolved through mechanisms outside courts, including guilds (merchant coalitions), families and local notables. In Section V.3 below, we argue that modern equivalents of these dispute mechanisms as well as corporate governance mechanisms are behind the success of Hybrid Sector firms in the same areas in the 1980s and 1990s.

After the foundation of the People's Republic of China in 1949, all of the pre-1949 capitalist companies and institutions were nationalized by 1950. Between 1950 and 1978, China's financial system consisted of a single bank – the People's Bank of China (PBOC), a central government owned and controlled bank under the Ministry of Finance, which served as both the central bank and a commercial bank, controlling about 93% of the total financial assets of the country and handling almost all financial transactions. With its main role to finance the physical production plans, the PBOC used both a “cash-plan” and a “credit-plan” to control the cash flows in consumer markets and transfer flows between branches.

The first main structural change began in 1978 and ended in 1984. By the end of 1979, the PBOC departed the Ministry and became a separate entity, while three state-owned banks took over some of its commercial banking businesses: The Bank of China³ (BOC) was given the mandate to specialize in transactions related to foreign trade and investment; the People's Construction Bank of China (PCBC), originally formed in 1954, was set up to handle transactions related to fixed investment (especially in manufacturing); the Agriculture Bank of China (ABC) was set up (in 1979) to deal with all banking business in rural areas; and, the PBOC was formally established as China's central bank and a two-tier banking system was formed. Finally, the fourth state-owned commercial bank, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) was formed in 1984, and took over the rest of the commercial transactions of the PBOC.

For most of the 1980s, the development of the financial system can be characterized by the fast growth of financial intermediaries outside of the “Big Four” banks. Regional banks (partially owned by local governments) were formed in the Special Economic Zones in the coastal areas; in rural areas, a network of Rural Credit Cooperatives (RCCs; similar to credit unions in the U.S.) was set up under the supervision of the ABC, while Urban Credit Cooperatives (UCCs), counterparts of the RCCs in the urban areas, were also founded. Non-bank financial intermediaries, such as the Trust and Investment Corporations (TICs; operating in selected banking and non-banking services with restrictions on both deposits and loans), emerged and proliferated in this period.

³ BOC, among the oldest banks currently in operation, was originally established in 1912 as a private bank, and specialized in foreign currency related transactions.

The most significant event for China's financial system in the 1990s was the inception and growth of China's stock market. Two domestic stock exchanges (SHSE and SZSE) were established in 1990 and grew very fast during most of the 1990s. However, the development of a supportive legal framework and institutions has been lagging behind that of the stock market. On a trial basis, China's first bankruptcy law was passed in 1986 (governing SOEs), but the formal Company Law was not effective until the end of 1999. This version of the Company Law governs all corporations with limited liability, publicly listed and traded companies, and branches or divisions of foreign companies, as well as their organization structure, securities issuance and trading, accounting, bankruptcy, mergers and acquisitions (for details see the website of China Securities Regulatory Commission, or CSRC, <http://www.csrc.gov.cn/>). In August 2006, a new bankruptcy law was enacted, and it will be effective by June 2007. This new law introduces the role of trustees in the bankruptcy procedure, along with other provisions enhancing creditor rights and facilitating the corporate bankruptcy procedure. We provide a detailed analysis of the status and problems of the stock market in Section IV below.

Following the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, financial sector reform has focused on state-owned banks and especially the problem of NPLs (the China Banking Regulation Committee was also established to oversee the banking industry). We will further discuss this issue in Section III. China's entry into the WTO in December 2001 marked the beginning of a new era, as we continue to observe increasing competition from foreign financial institutions and more frequent and larger scale capital flows. While increasingly larger inflows of foreign capital and the presence of foreign institutions will continue to drive further growth of the financial system and economy, larger scale capital flows can also increase the likelihood of damaging financial crises. We will discuss these issues in Sections IV and VI.

A developed financial system is characterized by, among other factors, the important role played by institutional investors. In China, institutional investor began to emerge in the late 1990s although their scale and significance in the financial system has been limited. The first two mutual funds (Guo Tai and Nan Fang) were established in 1998. There were 268 open-end mutual funds and 58 closed-end funds at the end of 2006 (China Galaxy Securities Co. Report), with total Net Asset Value (NAV) reaching 856 billion RMB (or \$110 billion), which is small compared to the assets within the banking sector. In 2003, a few Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII) entered the asset management industry, and they have been operating through forming joint ventures with Chinese companies. Endowed with limited capital and problems with the administration of the

pension system, pension funds have not played an important role in the stock or bond market.⁴ With a fast aging population and the growth of households' disposable income, further development of a multi-pillar pension system including individual accounts with employees' self-contributed (tax exempt) funds that can be directly invested in the financial markets is important for the development of both the financial system and the fiscal system as well as for social stability. Finally, there is no hedge fund that implements "long-short" strategies at present time, as short selling is prohibited.

Insert Figure 1 here.

Figure 1 depicts the current structure of the entire financial system. In what follows we will describe and examine each of the four sectors of the system. In addition to the standard sectors of banking and intermediation and financial markets, we will document the importance of the non-standard financial sector. Due to space limitation, we do not cover China's "foreign sectors" in this chapter; for discussions on the history and the role of these sectors in supporting the growth of the economy, see, for example, AQQ (2005b), and Prasad and Wei (2005) for a review on foreign direct investment (FDI).

II.2 Size and Efficiency of the Financial System: Banking and Markets

For a comparison of countries, we follow the law and finance literature and in particular the sample of countries studied in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (hereafter LLSV, 1997a, 1998). Their sample includes 49 countries, but China is excluded. In Table 1, we compare China's financial system (as of 2002) to those of LLSV sample countries, with some measures for financial systems taken from Levine (2002) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2001). For definitions of all the variables used in the tables and figures, see AQQ (2005a, b).

We first compare the *size* of a country's equity markets and banks relative to that country's gross domestic product (GDP; first panel of Table 1). In terms of total market capitalization, China's stock market, 32% of its GDP, is smaller than most of the LLSV sample countries with a weighted (by each country's GDP) average of 47% of GDP. In order to measure the actual size of the market, the "floating supply" of the market is a better measure than "market capitalization," because the latter includes non-tradable shares while the former measures the fraction of total market capitalization that is traded in the markets. In this regard, the size of China's stock market (11% of GDP) is much smaller than those of LLSV countries (with a weighted average of 27% of GDP). By contrast,

⁴ While there is a nation wide, government run pension system (financed mainly through taxes on employers and employees), the coverage ratio of the pension system varies significantly across regions and is particularly low in rural areas. Moreover, there is a very limited amount of capital in individual accounts and most of the capital has been invested in banks and government projects with low returns. See, for example, Feldstein (1999, 2003) and Feldstein and Liebman (2006), for more details on China's pension system.

China's banking system is much more important in terms of size relative to its stock markets, with its ratio of total bank credit to GDP (1.11) higher than even the German-origin countries (with a weighted average of 0.99). However, when we consider bank credit issued (or loans made) to the Hybrid Sector only, China's ratio drops sharply to 0.24, suggesting that most of the bank credit is issued to companies in the State and Listed Sectors. Moreover, China's banking system is not efficient: its overhead cost to total assets (0.12) is much higher than the average of French-origin countries (0.05), the next highest group of countries.

Insert Table 1 here.

The second panel of Table 1 compares the relative importance of financial markets vs. banks ("Structure indices"). China has the lowest scores for both "Structure Activity" (Log of the ratio of Float supply of market cap/Total Bank Credit) and "Structure size" (Log of the ratio of Market Capitalization/Total Bank Credit), suggesting that its banking sector is much larger than its financial markets, and this dominance by the banks over markets is stronger than the average of all LLSV sample countries. In terms of "Structure efficiency" (Log of product (Market capitalization/GDP) \times (bank overhead cost/bank total assets)), which denotes the relative efficiency of markets vs. banks, China has the highest score, suggesting that its stock markets are actually relatively more efficient than banks compared to other countries. This result is mainly driven by the extremely high (overhead) costs of China's banking system.

We also compare the development of the financial system ("Financial Development"), including both banks and markets (last panel of Table 1). Given that all other countries' measures were based on private bank credit, if we only include China's bank credit made to the *Hybrid Sector*, we find that China's overall financial market size, in terms of both "Finance Activity" (Log of product of (Float supply of market/GDP) \times (Private credit/GDP)) and "Finance Size" (Log of product of (Market capitalization/GDP) + (Private credit/GDP)), is smaller than the LLSV sample average level, and is only higher than the French-origin average. In terms of "Finance Efficiency" (Log of (Total floating supply/GDP)/Overhead cost), China's measure is below all sub-samples of LLSV countries. Based on the above evidence, we can conclude that China's financial system is dominated by a large, inefficient *banking sector*. Further, relatively little of the lending is to the Hybrid Sector, which as we will see in Section V, is the dynamic part of the economy.

II.3 Firms' Financing Channels: Aggregate Evidence

The four most important financing sources for all firms in China, in terms of firms' fixed asset investments, are: (domestic) bank loans, firms' self-fundraising, the state budget and FDI. By far the

two most important sources of financing channels are self-fundraising and bank loans. Consistent with previous evidence on China's banking sector, bank loans, including loans from the non-state banks, provide a large amount of funds to firms and constitute a large fraction of firms' total financing needs.

Self-fundraising includes proceeds from capital raised from *local* governments (beyond the state budget), communities and other investors, internal financing channels such as retained earnings and all other funds raised domestically by the firms. Since our current data source does not provide the breakdowns of "self-fundraising," we can only present the total figures. The size of total self-fundraising of all firms has been growing at an average annual rate of 17.8% over the period of 1994-2006. Total self-fundraising (for fixed asset investment) reached \$665.5 billion at the end of 2006, compared to a total of \$364.8 billion for domestic bank loans for the same year. It is important to point out that equity and bond issuance, which are included in self-fundraising, apply only to the Listed Sector, and account for a small fraction of this category. Moreover, self-fundraising is the most important source of financing for many types of firms. For example, individually owned companies (of the Hybrid Sector), not surprisingly, rely mostly on self-fundraising (about 90% of total financing). Interestingly, even for state- or quasi-state-owned companies, self-fundraising is also important in that it captures somewhere between 45% and 65% of total financing.

The state budget and FDI are the other two important financing sources. As was the case for all socialist countries, China used to rely on a central planning system to allocate the state budget to most of the companies in the country. But the state budget now only contributes 10% of *state-owned* companies' total funding. On the other hand, FDI is comparable to the state budget, both in terms of aggregate size and in terms of the relative importance in firms' financing. This evidence confirms that China has evolved from a centrally planned, closed economy toward an open market economy. For example, in terms of the ratio of FDI over GDP, China attracted more FDI than both South Korea and Taiwan during the 1990s.

With knowledge of the four financing channels at the aggregate level, we now focus on different types of firms' financing decisions. The results are presented in Figures 2-A, 2-B, and 2-C. In all of these figures, each of the four connected lines represents the importance of a particular financing channel over the time period of 1994-2002, measured by the percentage of firms' total financing coming from this channel.⁵ First, Figure 2-A (2-B) illustrates how firms in the Listed Sector (State Sector) finance their investment for fixed assets. While the Listed Sector has been

⁵ After 2002, *China Statistical Yearbook*, the source of our data, no longer provides the breakdowns of funds by their sources or by firm types, and as a result, the time period depicted in all panels of Figure 2 is limited to 1994-2002.

growing fast, SOEs are on a downward trend, as privatization of these firms is still in progress. Around 30% of publicly traded companies' funding comes from bank loans, and this ratio has been very stable (Figure 2-A). Around 45% of the Listed Sector's total funding comes from self-fundraising, including internal financing and proceeds from equity and bond issuance. Moreover, equity and bond sales, which rely on the use of external markets, only constitute a small fraction of total funds raised in comparison to internal financing and other forms of fundraising. Combined with the fact that self-fundraising is also the most important source of financing for the State Sector (Figure 2-B), we can conclude that alternative channels of financing are important even for the State and Listed Sectors.

Insert Figures 2-A, 2-B, and 2-C here.

Next, we consider how firms in the Hybrid Sector raise funds (Figure 2-C). Self-fundraising here includes all forms of internal finance, capital raised from family and friends of the founders and managers, and funds raised in the form of private equity and loans. Clearly, this category is by far the most important source of financing, accounting for close to 60% of total funds raised. Moreover, since firms in this sector operate in an environment with legal and financial mechanisms and regulations that are probably poorer than those available for firms in the State and Listed Sectors, financing sources may work differently from how they work in the State and Listed Sectors, and those in developed countries.

III. The Banking and Intermediation Sector

In this section we examine the status of China's banking and intermediation sector. After reviewing aggregate evidence on bank deposits and loans, we analyze the problem of NPLs in the banking sector as well as assess solutions to this problem. Finally, we review evidence on the growth of non-state banks and financial intermediaries.

III.1 Aggregate Evidence on Bank Deposits and Loans

As in other Asian countries, China's household savings rates have been high throughout the reform era. Given the growth of the economy, the sharp increase in personal income, and limited investment opportunities, it is not surprising that total bank deposits from individuals have been growing fast since the mid-1980s, with the 2006 figure approaching RMB11 trillion (\$1.4 trillion). From Figure 3-A, residents in metropolitan areas contribute the most to total deposits beginning in the late 1980s (roughly 50%), while deposits from enterprises (including firms from all three sectors) provide the second most important source. The role of deposits from government agencies and

organizations (including non-profit and for-profit organizations, not shown in the figure) has steadily decreased over time.

Insert Tables 2-A, 2-B, and Figures 3-A and 3-B here.

Table 2-A compares total savings and bank deposits across China, Japan, South Korea, and India during the period 1997-2002. In terms of the ratio of Gross Domestic Savings/GDP (“Gross Domestic Savings,” a category in the national accounts, includes more types of savings than bank deposits), China maintains the highest level (an average of 40%), while Japan leads the group in terms of total amount. Looking at the breakdown of bank deposits, interest-bearing “savings deposits” are by far the most important form of deposits in China, providing a good source for bank loans and other forms of investment. Figure 3-B compares total bank credit (over GNP) extended to Hybrid Sector firms in China, and privately owned firms (including those publicly listed and traded) in Taiwan and South Korea. For South Korea, we also plot the bank credit ratios during its high economic growth period of the 1970s and 1980s (each year appearing on the horizontal axis indicates the time period for China, while a particular year *minus* 20 indicates the time period for South Korea). We can see that the scale and growth of China’s ‘hybrid’ bank credit during 1997-2006 are far below those (of private bank credit) of Taiwan and South Korea in the same period, but are similar to those of South Korea twenty years ago. Consistent with the aggregate evidence from Section II above and our firm-level evidence below, we find that bank loans were one of the most important financing sources for Hybrid Sector firms but started to increase the influence.

Table 2-B breaks down China’s bank loans by maturities, loan purposes, and borrower types. First, along with the growth of the size of loans there has been a shift from short-term to long-term loans (first two columns). Second, the majority of loans goes to SOEs in manufacturing industries (“Industrial Loans” and “Commercial Loans”); further, most of the “Infrastructure/Construction Loans” (a small component of total loans) fund government sponsored projects; while the size of “Agricultural Loans” is much smaller. Third, the size of loans made to TVEs, privately- and collectively-owned firms, and joint ventures (last 3 columns), which all belong to the Hybrid Sector, is also much smaller.⁶ According to an IFC/World Bank report (Gregory et al. 2000), which incorporates data published by the PBOC, loans made to privately owned firms (also part of the Hybrid sector) from all banks is less than 1% of total loans made in 1998 with half of these loans from state-owned banks. Researchers have argued that the imbalance between loans made to the State Sector and the Hybrid Sector reflects the government’s policies of wealth transfer from the

⁶ Without detailed breakdowns of different types of loans made to different sectors, we cannot estimate the exact share of total loans made to the three sectors.

Hybrid Sector to the State Sector via state-owned banks (e.g., Brandt and Zhu 2000).

III.2 The Problem of NPLs and Possible Solutions

China's banking sector is dominated by large and inefficient, state-owned banks, namely, the "Big Four" banks of ICBC, BOC, PCBC, and ABC.⁷ The dominance of the Big Four banks also implies that the degree of competition within the banking sector is extremely low. For example, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2001) compare the five-bank concentration (share of the assets of the five largest banks in total banking assets), and find that China's concentration ratio of 91% at the end of 1997 (and for much of 1990s) is one of the highest in the world. However, China's concentration ratio has been falling sharply since 1997 with the entrance of many non-state banks and intermediaries.

The most glaring problem for China's banking sector, and for the entire financial system in the near future, is the amount of NPLs within state-owned banks, and in particular, among the Big Four banks. Reducing the amount of NPLs to normal levels is the most important task for China's financial system in the short term. The main obstacle when we analyze the severity and possible solutions of the NPLs is the lack of comprehensive and objective data on banks' profitability (aggregate and bank-level) and NPLs. The scarcity and deficiency in bank data can be viewed as a strategic disclosure decision of the government, which fuels speculation that the problem of NPLs must be severe. We mainly rely on official sources for our analysis on NPLs, but when examining possible solutions we also speculate based on data from non-government sources, including case studies from particular regions or banks. As a result, some of this data and speculations paint a much gloomier picture of the NPLs and China's state-owned banks than the official data suggests. Since without objective and accurate bank-level data we cannot determine the exact amount of NPLs or evaluate the feasibility and effectiveness of different solutions, we present both an optimistic view and a pessimistic view when discussing these issues.

Comparing NPLs

In Panel A of Table 3-A, we compare NPLs in China, the U.S., and other major Asian economies during 1998-2006 based on official figures. NPLs are measured by their size (in US\$ billion) and as a percentage of GDPs in the same year (shown in brackets). Measured as the fraction of GDPs, China's NPLs are the highest in the group from 2000 to 2006, and as high as 20% to 22.5%

⁷ La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002) show that the government owns 99.45% of the assets of the 10 largest commercial banks in China in 1995, one of the highest in their sample of 92 countries. Moreover, their result on the negative relationship between government ownership of banks and the growth of a country's economy seems to apply to China's State Sector and the banking sector. However, we show that the high government ownership of banks has not slowed down the growth of the Hybrid Sector.

of GDP (in 2000 and 2001). Notice that the official information on China's NPLs first became available in 1998, but the figures in 1998 and 1999 in Table 3-A probably significantly underestimate the actual size of NPLs in those years; this also explains the jump in the size of China's NPLs from 1999 to 2000. The cross-country comparison on NPLs includes the period during which Asian countries recovered from the 1997 financial crisis (e.g., the size of NPLs in South Korea exceeded 12% of GDP in 1999 but it was reduced to below 3% two years later), and the period during which the Japanese banking system was disturbed by the prolonged NPL problem (the size of Japan's NPLs is the largest of the group throughout the time period except for 2006; the ratio of NPLs over GDP reached 15.6% in 2001, but was reduced to below 5% by the end of 2005).⁸

Insert Table 3-A here.

As bad as the numbers in Panel A of Table 3-A appear, they may still significantly underestimate the amount of NPLs within China's banking system according to the pessimistic view. First, the official figures on outstanding NPLs (cumulated within all commercial banks in China) do not include the bad loans that have been transferred from banks to four state-owned asset management companies (AMCs), with the purpose of AMCs liquidating these bad loans. If we add the NPLs held by the four AMCs (book value of RMB 866 billion, or \$108 billion, shown in the last row of Table 3-B) in the first quarter of 2006 to the mix of NPLs shown in Panel A of Table 3-A, the total amount of China's NPLs would increase by two-thirds. Second, the classification of NPLs has been problematic in China. The Basle Committee for Bank Supervision classifies a loan as "doubtful" or bad when any *interest* payment is overdue by 180 days or more (in the U.S. it is 90 days); whereas in China, this step has not typically been taken until the *principal* payment is delayed beyond the loan maturity date or an extended due date, and in many cases, until the borrower has declared bankruptcy and/or has gone through liquidation. Qiu et al. (2000) estimate that the ratio of loan interest paid to *state-owned* banks over loan interest owed is on average less than 50% in 1999, suggesting that the actual ratio of NPLs over total loans made can be higher than 50% in 1999. This piece of evidence, along with others, suggests that the amount of NPLs (and as percentage of GDP) could be twice as large as the official figures reported in Panel A of Table 3-A.⁹

Since a large fraction of the NPLs among state-owned banks, and in particular, the Big Four banks, resulted from poor lending decisions made for SOEs, some of which were due to political or

⁸ With a secondary source from the Asian Banker, we also find that the profitability of China's banking system, measured by the return to equity or assets, is also among the lowest in the same group of countries during 2000-2002.

⁹ Consistent with this view, Lardy (1998) argues that, if using international standards on bad loans, the existing NPLs within China's state-owned banks as of the mid-1990s would make these banks' total net worth negative, so that the entire network of state banks would be insolvent.

other non-economic reasons, in our view the government should bear the burden of reducing the NPLs. This view of essentially treating NPLs as a fiscal problem implies that the ultimate source of eliminating NPLs lies in China's overall economic growth.¹⁰ As long as the economy maintains its strong growth momentum so that tax receipts also increase, the government can always assume the remainder of the NPLs without significantly affecting the economy. In this regard, Panel B of Table 3-A compares total outstanding government debt, and Panel C presents a comparison of the ratio of (NPLs + Government Debt)/GDP across countries, with the sum of NPLs and government debt indicating total burden of the government. Depending on data availability, total government debt is either measured by the sum of all types of domestic and foreign debt (the U.S., Japan, and India), or by the level of outstanding government bonds (all other countries) in a given year.

Unlike the severity of its NPL problem, the Chinese government does not carry a large amount of debt, with total outstanding government bonds growing from only 9% of GDP in 1998 to around 16% of GDP in 2005. By contrast, countries such as the U.S. and India have a large amount of government debt even though their banking sectors are healthy (as measured by low levels of NPLs). Japan is the only country in the group that has large amount of NPLs *and* government debt. When we combine the results from Panels A and B and compare total government burden in Panel C, we use two sets of ratios for China: the first set of ratios are based on official NPLs numbers presented in Panel A, while the second set (presented in brackets) is based on doubling the size of official NPLs. For the U.S. and Japan, we also present two sets of ratios. In addition to using total outstanding government debt, we also use ratios (in the brackets) based on the sum of *net* government debt and NPLs, where net government debt is the difference between government borrowing (a 'stock' measure) and government lending (also a stock measure); not surprisingly, these ratios are much lower than using the gross figures.

From Panel C, China's total government burden is in the middle of the pack: the ratios of total government burden over GDP (using the official NPL figures) are lower than those in the U.S., India, and Japan, are comparable with those of Taiwan, and are higher than Indonesia and Korea. China's ratios are much higher if NPL figures are doubled, but total government burden in that case is still comparable with or lower than that of the U.S. (using gross or net government debt) and much lower than Japan. Based on these crude comparisons, it seems that the NPLs will not be a particularly arduous burden for the Chinese government due to its small size of debt, while the same cannot be said for Japan. Caution is again needed for this conclusion: first, new NPLs in China may grow

¹⁰ See, for example, Sachs and Woo (1997 review article) and Rawski (2002) for different views on the prospects of long-run economic growth and statistics on growth in China.

much faster than in other countries; and second, China's currently small government debt may experience a sharp increase in the near future given the need for higher fiscal spending in areas such as pension plans and other social welfare programs.

Recognizing the importance of and its responsibility in reducing NPLs in the Big Four banks, the Chinese government has injected foreign currency reserves (mostly in the form of US dollars, T-bills, Euros and Yen) into these banks to improve their balance sheets in preparation for going public. This process began at the end of 2003, with the establishment of the Central Huijin Investment Company, through which the PBOC injected US\$45 billion of reserves into the BOC and PCBC, while ICBC (the largest commercial bank in China and one of the largest in the world in terms of assets) received US\$15 billion during the first half of 2005 (e.g., *Financial Times*, 01/09/2004, 04/21/2005; *Asia Wall Street Journal*, 01/13/2004). All three banks have since become publicly listed and traded in either the HKSE and/or the SHSE. Given that China's total foreign exchange reserve reached US\$1.07 trillion at the end of 2006 (*Associated Press*, 1/15/2007), the largest in the world, while the total amount of NPLs is around US\$160 billion (using the US\$1 = 8 RMB exchange rate) at the end of second quarter in 2006, the foreign reserve itself should be more than enough to remove all the existing NPLs off the books of all the banks in China.

However, the injection plan will not prevent new NPLs from originating in the banking system. In fact, it may create perverse incentives for state-owned banks, in that if these banks (that have received or will receive the cash/assets injection) believe that there will be a 'bailout' whenever they run into future financial distress, they lose the incentive to improve efficiency while an incentive to take on risky, negative-NPV projects surfaces. This moral hazard problem can thwart the government's efforts in keeping the NPLs in check, while similar problems occurred during and after the government bailout of the S&L crisis in the U.S. in 1980s (e.g., Kane 1989, 2003). Hence, it is important for the government to credibly commit that the injection plan is a one-time measure to boost the capital adequacy of these banks, and that there will be no bailout plans in the future, especially after they become listed companies. The second problem arises because the significant increase in foreign reserves is in part due to the presence of large amounts of speculative foreign currencies in anticipation of an RMB appreciation relative to major international currencies. Depending on how the government and the central bank allow the flexible RMB exchange rate mechanism introduced in July 2005 to operate, large movements of the speculative currencies may cause a twin crisis in the currency market and the banking sector. We further discuss this issue in Section VI below.

Reducing NPLs and Improving the Efficiency of State-owned Banks

In recent years, the Chinese government has taken active measures to reduce the NPLs and improve the efficiency of the banking sector. First, as mentioned above, four state-owned AMC's were formed with the goal of assuming the NPLs (and offering debt-for-equity swaps to the banks) accumulated in each of the Big Four banks and liquidating them. The liquidation process includes asset sales, tranching, securitization, and resale of loans to investors.¹¹ Table 3-B shows that *cash* recovery on the bad loans processed by the AMC's ranges from 6.9% to 35% between 2001 and 2006 (first quarter), while the asset recovery rates are slightly higher. A critical issue that affects the effectiveness of the liquidation process is the relationship among AMC's, banks, and distressed or bankrupt firms. Since both the AMC's and the banks are state-owned, it is not likely that the AMC's would force the banks to cut off (credit) ties with defaulted borrowers (SOEs or former SOEs) as a privately owned bank would do. Thus, as the old NPLs are liquidated, new NPLs from the same borrowers continue to surface.

Insert Tables 3-B and 3-C here.

Second, state-owned banks have diversified and improved their loan structure by increasing consumer-related loans while being more active in risk management and monitoring of loans made to SOEs. For example, the ratio of consumer lending to total loans made for the four state-owned banks increased from 1% in 1998 to 10% in 2002; by the end of 2004, 10% of all outstanding bank loans (RMB 2 trillion or \$250 billion) was extended to consumers. The size of mortgages, now the largest component (almost 90%) of consumer credit, grew 100 times between 1997 and 2006, reaching a total of RMB 2 trillion (\$250 billion) (*Xinhua News*). One problem with the massive expansion of consumer credit is that China lacks a national consumer-credit database to spot overstretching debtors, although a pilot system linking seven cities was set up in late 2004. The deficiency in the knowledge and training of credit risk and diligence of loan officers from state-owned banks is another significant factor in credit expansion, which can lead to high default rates and a large amount of new NPLs if the growth of the economy and personal income slows down. Accompanying the rapidly expanding automobile industry, the other fast growing category of individual-based loans is automobile loans, most of which are made by state-owned banks. The total balance of all China's individual auto loans rocketed from RMB 400 million (\$50 million) in 1998 to RMB 200 billion (\$25

¹¹ The sale of tranches of securitized NPLs to foreign investors first occurred in 2002. The deal was struck between Huarong, one of the four AMC's, and a consortium of U.S. investment banks led by Morgan Stanley (and including Lehman Brothers and Salomon Smith Barney) and was approved by the Chinese government in early 2003 (*Financial Times*, 05/2003).

billion) at the end of 2003, and as much as 30% of all auto sales were financed by loans during this period (*Financial Times*, 05/25/2005). The growth in both auto sales and loans slowed down significantly since 2004 in part due to the high default rates. Shanghai and Beijing have the largest number of car sales and loans. As many as 50% of debtors defaulted on their car loans in these cities. There are examples in which loan applications were approved based solely on applicants' description of their personal income without any auditing (*Barron's*, 12/06/2004). However, the slowdown of the auto loan market was temporary and it quickly resumed its fast pace of growth, in part due to the tremendous potential of the market. In aggregate auto loans amount to 10%-20% of the total amount spent on autos. Most loans mature in three to five years.¹²

The above examples on auto loans and consumer credit illustrate the importance of reforming state-owned banks in solving the problems of NPLs and improving the entire banking sector. A central question in reforming the state-owned banks is the ongoing privatization process. There are two imminent issues. First, more competition in the banking and intermediation sector, including the entrance of more non-state (domestic and foreign) banks and intermediaries, is good for improving the efficiency of both the Big Four banks and the entire banking sector.¹³ Another issue is the government's dual role as regulator and as majority owner. These potentially conflicting roles diminish the effectiveness in each of the two roles that the government intends to carry out. In Section IV below, we argue that the non-tradable government shares in all listed companies should be gradually sold off to ensure that the privatization process is complete. The same procedure should be applied to the privatization process of state-owned banks. Only after these banks are (majority) owned by non-government entities and individuals can they unconditionally implement all profit- and efficiency-enhancing measures. In fact, with a sample of both state- and non-state owned banks, Berger et al. (2006) show that the addition of foreign ownership stakes into banks' ownership structure is associated with significant improvement of bank efficiency.

Table 3-C presents the performance of IPOs of three of the Big Four banks (ABC remains in the State Sector) and that of the Bank of Communications (BComm). The most notable case is the IPO of ICBC. Simultaneously carried out in the HKSE and SHSE on October 27, 2006, ICBC raised over US\$20 billion, making it the largest IPO up to that date in the world. The first day (and first week cumulative) return, measured by the net percentage return of the closing price on the first (fifth)

¹² A few foreign lenders (e.g., GM and Ford) were approved to enter China's auto loan market by forming joint ventures with Chinese automakers (*Financial Times*, 05/27/2005).

¹³ For example, Park et al. (2003) find that competition among banks and intermediaries leads to better effort of the banks (especially state-owned banks) and better loan decisions in China's rural areas.

trading day over offer price, was almost 15%, suggesting high demand for ICBC's H shares among (foreign) investors. Its current market capitalization ranks ICBC the second largest bank in the world, behind only Citibank, but only 22% of the market cap is 'free float' or tradable. The largest foreign shareholder is Goldman Sachs with its 5.8% ownership stake negotiated before the IPO. While the IPOs of the other three large state-owned have not grabbed as much attention, they are also successful in terms of total proceeds raised, and they have all attracted significant foreign ownership at the IPO date. On the other hand (from the *Chinese Banking Regulatory Commission*), Moody's ratings on these publicly listed banks (on both deposits and loans) range from A to Baa (highest rating is Aaa); while S&P rates these banks' outstanding bonds between A and BBB (highest rating is AAA).

To summarize, the optimistic view holds that, despite the large amount of existing NPLs, the current reform of state-owned banks and development of the banking sector have already been effective in reducing NPLs, which is why NPLs have been falling in recent years (2000-2006; Panel A of Table 3-A). Given that the economy will probably maintain its current pace of growth, the government can always write off a large fraction of the rest of the NPLs to avert any serious problems for China. However, the pessimistic view believes that NPLs are much bigger than the official statistics suggest to begin with, and that a substantial amount of new NPLs will continue to arise within state-owned banks. Moreover, the reform of the banking sector will not be effective because it will take a long time before the government relinquishes majority control of state-owned banks. During this period, if the growth of the economy significantly slows down, while the accumulation of NPLs continues, the banking sector problems could lead to a financial crisis. This could spill over into other sectors of the economy and cause a slowdown in growth or a recession. In this view, the NPL problem poses the most serious problem to China's continued prosperity.

III.3 Growth of Non-state Financial Intermediaries

The development of both non-state banks and other (state and non-state) financial institutions is crucial for China to have a stable and functioning banking system in the future. In addition to boosting the overall efficiency of the banking system and alleviating the problems of NPLs, these financial institutions provide funding to support the growth of the Hybrid Sector.

First, we examine and compare China's insurance market to other Asian economies (South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore). In terms of the ratio of total assets managed by insurance companies over GDP (Figure 3-C), China's insurance market is significantly smaller than that of other economies. At the end of 2006 total assets managed were still less than 10% of GDP (while this ratio

for the other three economies is over 30%). It is clear that the insurance industry is also significantly undersized compared to China's banking industry, and property insurance is particularly underdeveloped due to the fact that the private real estate market was only recently established (in the past most housing was allocated by employers or the government). Despite the fast growth of insurance coverage and premium income, at the end of 2000 only 1.8% of the total population was covered by life insurance (resulting in a per capita premium of only RMB 127 per year); coverage ratios for property insurance are even lower (*Almanac of China's Finance and Banking* 2000). The encouraging news is that coverage ratios have been growing steadily at an average annual rate of 6% between 1998 and 2005 (*XinHua News*).

Insert Tables 4-A and 4-B, and Figure 3-C here.

Table 4-A provides a (partial) breakdown of the different types of banks. During the period of 2001-2004, although the Big Four banks dominate in every aspect of the banking sector, the role of the non-Big Four banks in the entire banking sector cannot be ignored. As of 2004, other banks and credit cooperatives' total assets compose close to 50% of the Big Four (the actual fraction is likely to be higher due to incomplete information on all types of deposit-taking institutions); similar comparisons can be made for outstanding loans. In addition, these banks have less NPLs than the Big Four banks. Table 4-B provides evidence on the growth of non-bank intermediaries. Overall, the growth of these non-bank intermediaries has been impressive since the late 1990s. In terms of combined total assets held or managed, the size of all the banks and intermediaries outside of the Big Four banks (first column in Table 4-B) is about 60% of the Big Four banks at the end of 2004. Among them, "other commercial banks" (many of them are state-owned), RCCs, and TICs hold the largest amount of assets; the size of foreign banks and mutual funds (not listed in the table) is minuscule, and these are likely to be the focus of development in the near future.¹⁴ Finally, our coverage of non-bank financial institutions excludes various forms of informal financial intermediaries, some of which are deemed illegal but overall provide important financing to firms in the Hybrid Sector.

IV. Financial Markets and Publicly Traded Firms

In this section, we examine China's financial markets, including both the stock and bond markets, and the recent addition of venture capital and private equity markets. We also compare, at

¹⁴ Postal savings (deposit-taking institutions affiliated with local post offices) is another form of non-bank intermediation that is not reported in Table 4-B due to lack of time series data. However, at the end of 1999, total deposits within the postal savings system exceeded RMB 380 billion, or 6.4% of all deposits in China.

the aggregate level, how firms raise funds in China and in other emerging economies through external markets in order to determine if China's experience in terms of a firm's fundraising is unique. We then focus on publicly traded companies and examine their financing and investment decisions. Finally, we discuss how to further develop financial markets as well as improve corporate governance and the performance of listed firms.

IV.1 Stock Exchanges and Market Inefficiencies

After the inception of China's domestic stock exchanges, the SHSE and SZSE, in 1990, they initially grew quickly. The high growth rates continued in most of the 1990s, and the market reached its peak by the end of 2000. The momentum of the market then reversed during the next five years as it went through a major correction with half of the market capitalization lost. Interestingly, most of the losses were recovered by the end of 2006, and many observers predict that the market will reach new heights in 2007. Figure 4 compares the performance of some of the major stock exchanges around the world, as measured by the buy-and-hold return in the period 1992-2006 (gross return at the end of 2006 with \$1 invested in each of the valued-weighted stock indexes at the end of 1992). While the performance of the value-weighted SHSE index (the calculation for the SZSE is very similar) is better than that of FTSE (London) and the Nikkei Index, whose poor performance was caused by the prolonged recession of the Japanese economy in the 1990s, the SHSE under performs the S&P 500 and the SBE (India), the best performing market index of the group. Since China's economy was growing at much higher rates than the U.S. during the period (10.1% per annum for China vs. 3.0% for the U.S. in real terms), the fact that the SHSE index under performed the S&P index suggests that listed firms are among the low-quality firms in China.

Insert Figure 4 here.

At the end of 2005, the *combined* total market capitalization of the SHSE and SZSE ranked 15th among the largest stock exchanges in the world. However, a significant fraction of all the shares is not traded. The Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE), where selected firms from Mainland China can now be listed and traded, is ranked 10th in the world by itself. In addition, there are two other markets established to complement the main exchanges. First, a fully electronically operated market ("*Er Ban Shi Chang*" or "Second-tier Market," similar to the NASDAQ) for Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) was opened in June 2004. It was designed to lower the entry barriers for SME firms, especially newly established firms in the high-tech industries. There are currently (by the end of February 2007) 119 firms listed in this market. Second, a "third-tier market" ("*San Ban Shi Chang*") was established to deal primarily with de-listing firms and other over-the-Counter (OTC)

transactions. Since 2001, some publicly listed firms on both SHSE and SZSE that do not meet the listing standards have been delisted and the trading of their shares shifted to this market.

China's stock markets are not efficient in that prices and investors' behavior are not necessarily driven by fundamental values of listed firms. For example, Morck et al. (2000) find that stock prices are more 'synchronous' (stock prices move up and down together) in emerging countries including China than in developed countries. They attribute this phenomenon to poor minority investor protection and imperfect regulation of markets in emerging markets. With a large data set of individual trading, Feng and Seasholes (2004) find that buy and sell trades are highly correlated (occur at the same time period, such as in the same day) in China, especially among investors who conduct their trades near one of the two stock exchanges or near firms' headquarters.

In addition, there have been numerous lawsuits against insider trading and manipulation. A good case study is the rise and fall of Guangxia Industry Co., Ltd., dubbed as 'China's Enron.' Located in Ningxia Province, one of the poorest areas of China, Guangxia was listed on the SZSE in 1994 as a manufacturer of floppy disks and related products. After experiencing poor and deteriorating performance in its original line of business and other diversifying new lines of businesses for the first five years, the company reported unprecedented high EPS (earnings per share) at the end of 1999, and claimed that they had mastered the techniques of CO₂ fluid extraction and signed a multiple-year sales contract with a German company. Subsequently, the company's stock price shot up from RMB 14 to RMB 76 in one year and realized an annual return of 440%, highest among all listed companies in either stock exchange in 2000. After an article was published in *Caijing Magazine* ('Finance and Economics Magazine,' August 3, 2001) and blew the whistle on the 'star' company, the CSRC launched an investigation and found that the reported earnings as well as many sales records and contracts, including the one with the German company, were fabricated, and in fact the company continued losing money in their businesses. The most damaging fact from this case is that, unlike Enron, Guangxia's managers and other insiders did not use any sophisticated accounting and finance maneuvers to mask their losses (even by China's standards). The company's top executives were criminally charged and its auditors lost their licenses, while shareholders' lawsuits were eventually processed by courts for the first time in the country.

The above example also reveals that the inefficiencies in the Chinese stock markets can be attributed to poor and ineffective regulation. The current process of listing companies fosters both a problem of adverse selection among firms seeking an initial public offering (IPO), and a moral hazard problem among listed firms. First, even though there is no explicit regulation or law against

the listing of firms from the Hybrid Sector, the going public process strongly favors former SOEs with connections with government officials. For example, until recently each candidate firm must apply and obtain listing quota/permission from the government; all candidate firms must (and still do) disclose financial and accounting information and are subject to a lengthy evaluation process. The process is inefficient due to bureaucracy, fraudulent disclosure, and lack of independent auditing. As a result, most of the listed firms are indeed former SOEs. Second, once listed, managers in firms with severe agency problems do not have an incentive to manage assets to grow, but rather to rely on the external capital markets to raise funds – mainly through mergers and acquisitions and seasoned offerings of securities – to pursue private benefits. (For more case studies to illustrate the above problems, see AQQ (2005b).)

IV.2 Overview of Bond Markets

Table 5-A provides information on China’s bond markets. The government bond market had an annual growth rate of 26.9% during the period 1990-2005 in terms of newly issued bonds, while total outstanding bonds reached RMB 2,877.4 billion (or US\$360 billion) at the end of 2005.¹⁵ The second largest component of the bond market is called “policy financial bonds” (total outstanding amount RMB 1,781.8 billion, or \$223 billion at the end of 2005). These bonds are issued by “policy banks,” which operate under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance, and the proceeds of bond issuance are invested in government run projects and industries such as infrastructure construction (similar to municipal bonds in the U.S.). Compared to government-issued bonds, the size of the corporate bond market is minuscule: In terms of the amount of outstanding bonds at the end of 2005, the corporate bond market is less than one-eleventh of the size of the government bond market.

Insert Table 5-A and Figure 5 here.

In fact, the under-development of the bond market, especially the corporate bond market, relative to the stock market, is common among Asian countries. In Figure 5 we compare different components (bank loans to private sectors or the Hybrid Sector of China; stock market capitalization; public/government and private/corporate bond markets) of the financial markets around the world at the end of 2003. First, compared to Europe and the U.S., the size of both the government (public) and corporate (private) bond markets is smaller in Asia excluding Japan (Hong Kong, South Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines, and Thailand); even in Japan, the size of the

¹⁵ During most of the period 1988-2003, Moody’s rated China’s government bonds (foreign currency) A2 or A3 (lower than Aa3 and A1 but higher than Baa1; highest rating is Aaa) with a “positive” or “stable” outlook, while the rating on bank deposits (foreign currency ceilings) was Baa, at or above the ‘investment’ grade. These ratings are better or comparable than Moody’s ratings on government bonds from most emerging economies.

corporate bond market is much smaller compared with its government bond market. Second, consistent with previous evidence, the size of all four components of China's financial markets are small relative to that of other regions and countries, including bank loans made to the Hybrid Sector (private sector) in China (other countries). Moreover, the most under-developed component of China's financial markets is the corporate bond market (labeled "private" bond market).

There are a number of reasons for the underdevelopment in bond markets in China and other parts of Asia (see, e.g., Herring and Chatusripitak 2000). Lack of sound accounting/auditing system and high-quality bond-rating agencies is an important factor. Given low creditor protection and court inefficiency (in China and most other emerging economies) the recovery rates for bondholders during default are low, which in turn leads to underinvestment in the market (by domestic and foreign investors). Lack of a well constructed yield curve is another important factor in China. Given the small size of the publicly traded Treasury bond market and lack of historical prices, we can only plot "snapshots" of a partial yield curve (maturities range from one month to 1 year only) based on pricing data of Treasury bonds in the national interbank market. This is far from the standard yield curve covering interest rates on bond maturities ranging from one month to 10 years. The deficiencies in the term structure of interest rates hamper the development of derivatives markets that enable firms and investors to manage risk, as well as the effectiveness of the government's macroeconomic policies. Therefore, it is important that China develop its bond markets in the near future along with its legal system and related institutions.

IV.3 Fundraising through Financial Markets and International Comparison

First, we briefly examine the role of financial markets in helping firms raise funds (Table 5-B). Both the scale and relative importance (compared with other channels of financing) of China's financial markets for finance from outside the firm (as of the end of 2002), or External Capital as it is called in the literature, are not significant. For example, for the ratio of External Capital and GNP, the LLSV (1997a) sample average is 40%, compared to China's 16% (using only the floating supply part of the stock market, rather than the total market capitalization). For the ratio of total debt (including bank loans and bonds) over GNP, the LLSV sample average is 59%, compared to China's 35%. However, if we include all debt, including bank loans, issued to all sectors including the State Sector, this ratio increases to 79%, suggesting that the majority of debt does not go through the capital markets, and is consistent with evidence on bank credit.

Insert Table 5-B here.

Next, we compare, at the aggregate level, external financing (i.e. financing from outside the

firm), in China and other major emerging economies. We also relate the aggregate financing channels with the growth of the economy during different periods, in order to determine whether the Chinese experience in financing is unique. First, Figure 6-A compares the development of stock markets at the aggregate level, while Figure 6-B compares the growth rates of (PPP-adjusted) GDP. Both Taiwan and South Korea experienced high GDP growth in the 1970s and early 1980s, while the total market capitalization of their respective stock markets accounted for less than 20% of their GNPs during the same period, and the growth of stock markets did not take off until the mid- to late-1980s. Figure 6-C compares the growth of corporate bond markets: South Korea having the fastest growth path, while in Taiwan and China the corporate bond markets seem to lag the development of stock markets. Finally, Figure 6-D compares total equity issuance including IPOs and SEOs (seasoned equity offerings). With the exception of South Korea, China seems to be on similar pace in terms of size of equity issuance (as fraction of GNP in a given year) with Taiwan, India, and Brazil.

Insert Figures 6-A through 6-D here.

From the above comparisons it is clear that the development of China's external markets relative to its overall economic growth is not dramatically different from other emerging countries. One of the common patterns is that the development of external markets trails that of the growth of the overall economy. During the early stages of economic growth, alternative institutions and mechanisms can support the growth of firms and the overall economy, as is the case for China based on our evidence. Perhaps similar institutions have worked well in other emerging and developed economies as well.

IV.4 Evidence on the Listed Sector

In this section, we examine publicly listed and traded companies in China. It is worthwhile to first clarify whether firms from the Hybrid Sector can become listed and publicly traded. Regulations and laws (the 1986 trial version of the bankruptcy law and the 1999 version of the Company Law) never prohibit the listing of Hybrid Sector firms; and selected firms from the Hybrid Sector enter the Listed Sector through an IPO or acquiring a listed firm from the inception of SHSE and SZSE. However, the accessibility of equity markets for these firms has been much lower than for former SOEs in practice due to the enforcement of the listing standards and process. As a result, AQQ (2005a) find that 80% of their sample of more than 1,100 listed firms are converted from former SOEs. In recent years, the government has attempted to change the composition of listed firms by relaxing regulations toward Hybrid Sector firms.

Until recently, listed firms in China issued both tradable and nontradable shares (Table 6-A).

The nontradable shares were either held by the government or by other state-owned legal entities (i.e., other listed or non-listed firms or organizations). Among the tradable shares, Classes A and B shares are listed and traded in either the SHSE or SZSE, while Class A (B) shares are issued to and traded by Chinese investors (foreign investors including those from Taiwan and Hong Kong and QFIIs). While the two share classes issued by the same firm are identical in terms of shareholder rights (e.g., voting and dividend), B shares were traded at a significant discount relative to A shares and are traded less frequently than A shares.¹⁶ The “B share discount” has been reduced significantly since the CSRC allowed Chinese citizens to trade B shares (with foreign currency accounts) in 2001. In addition, Class H shares, issued by selected “Red Chip” Chinese companies, are listed and traded on the HKSE. Finally, there are N shares and S shares for firms listed in the U.S. and Singapore but operate in China (we omit discussions on these shares since they are not listed on the domestic exchanges). After the reforms discussed below in Section IV.6, government shares became G shares and are tradable.

Table 6-B demonstrates that nontradable shares constituted a majority of all shares and most of these shares were held by the state, while the majority of tradable shares were A shares. Table 6-C provides some evidence on the relation between ownership and control of the Board of Directors.¹⁷ Consistent with Tables 6-A and 6-B and the “one-share, one-vote” scheme adopted by firms in the Listed Sector, shareholders including the state and legal person shareholders (that typically own the majority of shares) appoint the board members.

Insert Tables 6-A, 6-B, and 6-C here.

We next describe standard corporate governance mechanisms in the Listed Sector. First, according to the (2005) Company Law, listed firms in China have a two-tier board structure: the Board of Directors (five to nineteen members) and the Board of Supervisors (at least three members), with supervisors ranking above directors. The main duty of the Board of Supervisors is to monitor firms’ operations as well as top managers and directors; it consists of representatives of shareholders and employees, with the rest either officials chosen from government branches or executives from the parent companies; directors and top managers of the firms cannot hold positions as supervisors. The

¹⁶ Explanations of the B share discount include: 1) Foreign investors face higher information asymmetry than domestic investors, 2) lower B share prices compensation for the lack of liquidity (due to low trading volume), and 3) the A share premium reflects a speculative bubble component among domestic investors. See Chan, Menkveld, and Yang (2007) and Mei, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2003) for more details.

¹⁷ Information provided in Table 6-C and on corporate governance is based on a survey of 257 SHSE-listed firms conducted in 2000 by Integrity Management Consulting and the Research Center of SHSE, “Corporate Governance and Enterprise Reform in China: Building the institutions of Modern Market” (Tenev et al. 2002, the World Bank) and Schipani and Liu (2002).

Board of Directors serves similar duties as their counterparts in the U.S., including appointing and firing CEOs. The Chairman (one person) and Vice Chairman (one or two) of the Board are elected by all directors (majority votes); at the approval of the Board, the CEO and other top managers can become members of the Board. The CSRC requires at least one third (a minimum of two people) of the Board to be independent.

Since the Law does not specify that every member of the Board must be elected by shareholders during general shareholder meetings, in practice some directors are nominated and appointed by the firms' parent companies and the nomination process is usually kept secret (as shown in Table 6-C, in particular for former SOEs). Since not all members of either board are elected by shareholders, a major problem with the board structure is the appointment of and contracting with the CEOs. Fan, Wong, and Zhang (2007) find that almost one-third of their sample of 625 listed companies' CEOs are either current or former government bureaucrats; the performance of these firms is significantly worse than other firms without politically connected CEOs. Based on firm-level compensation data (available since 1998 due to disclosure requirements), Fung et al. (2003) and Kato and Long (2004) find that no listed firms grant stock options to CEOs or board members, while the cash-based compensation level for CEOs is much lower than their counterparts in developed countries, and the consumption of perks, such as company cars, is prevalent.

Second, the existing ownership structure, characterized by the large amount of non-tradable shares including cross-holdings of shares among listed companies and institutions, makes it difficult to carry out value-increasing M&As. According to the *China Mergers and Acquisitions Yearbook* (2004), there are 925 M&A's involving listed firms in 2003 totaling US\$9.35 billion, only 1.8% of the total market capitalization. In many deals, a Hybrid Sector firm (non-listed) acquires a listed firm that is converted from an SOE, but the large amount of non-tradable shares held by the state remain intact after the transaction.¹⁸ Such an acquisition can be the means through which low quality, non-listed companies bypass listing standards and access financial markets.

Third, an important factor contributing to the occurrence of corporate scandals is the lack of institutional investors (including non-depository financial intermediaries) as they are a very recent addition to the set of financial institutions in China. Professional investors would perhaps not be so easily taken in by simple deceptions. Another factor is that the enforcement of laws is questionable

¹⁸ If we include the cross-border M&As and transactions between parent companies and subsidiaries, the total amount increases to US \$47 billion in 2000, \$14 billion in 2001, \$29 billion in 2002, and \$24 billion in the first three quarters of 2003. 68% of all M&A deals (66% in terms of dollar deal amount) are initiated by Hybrid Sector firms, while former SOEs and foreign firms initiate 29% and 3% of the rest, respectively (27% and 7% in deal amount). M&As are most active in coastal regions, and in industries such as machinery, information technology, retail, and gas and oil.

due to the lack of legal professionals and institutions. For example, ineffective bankruptcy implementation makes the threat and penalty for bad firm performance non-credible.¹⁹ As mentioned above, the implementation of the new Bankruptcy Law, including the addition of court-appointed trustees to overseeing the bankruptcy procedure, is expected to enhance the protection of creditor rights and expedite the procedure.

Fourth, the government plays the dual roles of regulator and blockholder for many listed firms, including banks and financial services companies. The main role of the CSRC (counterpart of the SEC in the U.S.) is to monitor and regulate stock exchanges and listed companies. The government exercises its shareholder control rights in listed firms through the Bureau of National Assets Management, which holds large fractions of nontradable shares, or other SOEs (with their holdings of nontradable shares). However, since the top officials of the Bureau are government officials, it is doubtful that they will pursue their fiduciary role as control shareholders diligently. Moreover, the government's dual roles can lead to conflicting goals (maximizing profits as shareholder vs. maximizing social welfare as regulator or social planner) in dealing with listed firms, which in turn weaken the effectiveness of both of its roles.²⁰ There are cases in which the government, aiming to achieve certain social goals, influenced the markets through state-owned institutional investors (e.g., asset management companies) but created unintended adverse effects.

Overall, internal and external governance for the Listed Sector is weak, and further development of governance mechanisms is one of the main objectives for this sector going forward. In Section IV.6 below we provide some general suggestions. In addition, AQQ (2005b) show that the dividend ratio, valuation (Tobin's Q) and post-IPO performance of listed firms in China are much lower or worse compared to similar firms operating in countries with stronger investor protections. In summary, the overall evidence on the comparison of China and other countries' external markets and listed firms is consistent with LLSV (1997a, 1998) predictions: With an underdeveloped legal system and weak investor (both shareholder and creditor) protection, China's small markets for finance from outside the firm and low-quality of listed firms come as no surprise.

IV.5 Private Equity/Venture Capital and the Funding of New Industries

Allen and Gale (1999, 2000a) have suggested that stock market-based economies, such as the

¹⁹ Cross-country information on the efficiency of bankruptcy procedures, based on surveys of lawyers and bankruptcy judges around the world, is available from World Bank (<http://rru.worldbank.org/Doingbusiness>). Among 108 countries, China's "goals of insolvency" index is equal to the median of the sample.

²⁰ Gordon and Li (2003) show that the ownership structure (with large state ownership stakes) can be attributed to government collecting monopoly rents from investors and subsidizing listed firms that were formerly SOEs. However, they argue that this behavior is not as efficient as explicit taxes on investors.

U.K. in the 19th century and the U.S. in the 20th century, have been more successful in developing *new* industries than intermediary-based economies such as Germany and Japan. They argue that markets are better than banks for funding new industries, because evaluation of these industries based on experience is difficult, and there is wide diversity of opinion. Stock market-based economies such as the U.S. and U.K. also tend to have well-developed systems for the acquisition and distribution of information, so the cost of information to investors is low. Markets then work well because investors can gather information at low costs and those that anticipate high profits can provide the finance to the firms operating in the new industries.

An important part of this process is the private equity/venture capital sector (see, e.g., Kortum and Lerner 2000). Venture capitalists are able to raise large amounts of funds in the U.S. because of the prospect that successful firms will be able to undertake an IPO. With data from 21 countries, Jeng and Wells (2000) find that venture capital is less important in other countries, while the existence of an active IPO market is the critical determinant of the importance of venture capital in a country. This is consistent with the finding of Black and Gilson (1998) in a comparison of the U.S. and Germany, that the primary reason venture capital is relatively successful in the U.S. is the active IPO market that exists there. AQQ (2005b) provide detailed information on the fast-growing private equity/venture capital sector in China.

The reason that China should develop active venture capital and private equity markets is to provide financing for new industries. What is unusual about China (perhaps along with India) is that it currently has the ability to develop both traditional industries, such as manufacturing, and in the near future new, high-tech industries, such as aerospace, computer software, semiconductors, and bio-genetics. This is different from the experience of South Korea and Taiwan in the 1970s and that of most other emerging economies in the 1990s, as all these other countries focused on developing manufacturing industries first. In terms of developing traditional industries (e.g., Korea and Taiwan in the 1970s), China has already followed suit in first introducing advanced (relative to domestic companies) but not the most advanced technologies from developed countries; and “nationalizing” these technologies within designated companies before moving toward the more advanced technologies. Allen and Gale (1999, 2000a) argue that banks are better than financial markets for funding mature industries because there is wide agreement on how they should be managed, so the delegation of the investment decision to a bank works well. This delegation process, and the economies of scale in information acquisition through delegation, makes bank-based systems more efficient in terms of financing the growth in these industries. Therefore, the banking system can

contribute more in supporting the growth and development of these industries than markets.

IV.6 Further Development of Financial Markets

As we have documented, the financial markets in China do not currently play nearly as important a role as banks. Going forward, if China wishes to develop high-technology industries as discussed in Section IV.5 then it is important that it improves its financial markets. In addition, if it is to enlarge risk management possibilities for its financial institutions and firms it needs to develop new financial products and markets. Finally, if there is to be an alternative to banks for raising large amounts of capital, then China needs deep and efficient markets.

In recent years the performance of the stock markets has been volatile. This is somewhat surprising given the robust performance of the real economy. We attribute this (relatively) poor performance to a number of factors including the following:

- (i) Limited self-regulation and formal regulation.
- (ii) The large overhang of shares owned by government entities.
- (iii) The lack of listed firms originating in the Hybrid Sector.
- (iv) The lack of trained professionals.
- (v) The lack of institutional investors.
- (vi) Limited financial markets and products.

It is important that these weaknesses be overcome. However, some of these are problems that must be tackled over the long run. They cannot be solved in a few years. We discuss each in turn.

Improve Regulations

There are two ways in which markets are regulated in practice and each has advantages and disadvantages: First, market forces and self-regulation, and second, government regulation.

A good example of regulation through market forces and self-regulation is provided by the capital markets in the UK in the nineteenth and early twentieth century (Michie, 1987). The role of government regulation and intervention was minimal. Despite this the markets did extremely well and London became the financial capital of the world. Many firms and countries from all over the world raised large amounts of funds. Reputation and trust were an important factor in the smooth operation of these markets. For example, in an important paper Franks et al. (2003) compare the early twentieth century capital markets with those in the mid-twentieth century. Despite extensive changes in the laws protecting minority shareholders there was very little change in the ways in which the market operated. The authors attribute this to the importance of trust.

We argue below that China's Hybrid sector is another example of a situation where market forces are effective. Formal regulation and legal protections do not play much role and yet financing and governance mechanisms are quite effective. In this case, as we shall see, it appears that competition as well as reputation and trust work well.

In contrast, the examples of fraud and other problems of manipulation and the inefficiency of markets pointed to in Section IV.1 suggest that in China's formal financial markets these alternative mechanisms do not work well. Although such mechanisms may develop in the long run as in the nineteenth and early twentieth century U.K., it seems that in the short run at least it is likely to require formal government regulation of the type developed in the U.S. in the 1930s and subsequently as a response to the stock market collapse that started in 1929 and the Great Depression. There is evidence from many countries that this type of formal regulation is effective. For example, based on a study of securities laws with the focus on the public issuance of new equity in 49 countries (China is not included) LLS (2006) find that disclosure and liability rules help to promote stock market development.

Sale of Government Shares in Listed Firms

One of the major problems Chinese stock markets has faced in recent years has been caused by the large amount of shares in listed companies owned by the government and government entities shown in Table 6-B. The Chinese government attempted sales of state shares of selected firms in 1999 and 2001, but halted the process both times after share prices plunged and investors grew panicky about the value of the entire market. This overhang created great uncertainty about the quantity of shares that would come onto the market going forward. This uncertainty was probably in part responsible for the stagnation of share prices between 2002-2005 despite the very high levels of growth in the economy.

In 2005 the government announced a new plan of "fully floating" state shares. Under the new plan, the remaining state shares among listed firms are converted to "G" shares. The CSRC outlines the format for compensating existing shareholders and also imposes lockups and restrictions on the amount of G shares that can be sold immediately after they become tradable. The details of the "fully floating plan" for a firm, including the number of G shares to be granted to each Class A shareholder and the time window (e.g., one to three years) of G shares become fully floating, must be approved by two thirds of Class A shareholders of the firm.

Three remarks for the sales of state shares are in order. First, the government's commitment to the plan is superior to a series of partially unanticipated trials that are subject to termination if a

significantly negative market reaction is observed. Second, while under the current plan the full floating of all G shares may only take a few years (if this is what the majority of shareholders of all firms desire) and hence may trigger some volatility, the plan does compensate Class A shareholders for the negative price impact and allow them to decide on the timing of the floating. Third, there is some uncertainty as to whether firms will sell at the same time or not. If they do sell simultaneously then there may be a lack of overall liquidity and this may induce volatility in the markets. Time will tell the extent to which this will be a problem.

Encourage Listing of Firms from the Hybrid Sector

One of the major problems of the stock exchanges is that most of the firms listed are former SOEs. Relatively few are firms from the more dynamic Hybrid Sector. A high priority for reform for the markets is changing of listing requirements to make it advantageous for dynamic and successful companies to become listed on the exchanges.

Train More Professionals

This is the most important factor in terms of improving the enforcement of laws and contracts. First, an independent and efficient judicial system requires a sufficient supply of qualified legal professionals. The Ministry of Justice of China states that there are 110,000 lawyers and 9,000 law firms as of 2002, while Orts (2001) estimates that there are 150,000 lawyers in China, roughly the same number of licensed attorneys as in the state of California. Lawyers represent only 10% to 25% of all clients in civil and business cases, and even in criminal prosecutions, lawyers represent defendants in only half of the cases. Among the approximately five million business enterprises in China, only 4% of them currently have regular legal advisers. Moreover, only one-fifth of all lawyers in China have law degrees, and even a lower fraction of judges have formally studied law at a university or college. As mentioned before, a similar situation exists for auditors and accounting professionals.

Encourage the Development of Institutional Investors

In most developed stock markets institutional investors, such as insurance companies, pension funds, mutual funds, and hedge funds, play an important role. They employ well-trained professionals who are able to evaluate companies well. This causes markets to have a higher degree of efficiency than if they are dominated by individual investors. In addition, there can be advantages in terms of corporate governance if institutional investors actively participate in the monitoring of firms' managers and are directly involved in firms' decision-making process as blockholders of stocks. For example, in the U.S., pension funds such as CALPERS have become the symbol of

shareholder activism that strengthens corporate governance, while in Japan and Germany, financial intermediaries serve similar purposes. For China, an effective way to improve the efficiency of China's stock markets as well as corporate governance of listed firms is to encourage further development of domestic financial intermediaries that can act as institutional investors. With their large-scale capital and expertise in all relevant areas of business, financial intermediaries can provide a level of stability and professionalism that is sorely lacking in China's financial markets.

Currently institutional investors such as insurance companies, mutual funds and pension funds are relatively small in terms of assets held given their early stage in the development. However, they are expanding dramatically. For example, the sum of all mutual funds' net assets values reached RMB 8.6 trillion (or \$1.08 trillion) at the end of 2006. One way to further encourage the development of such intermediaries is to give tax advantages to various types of products such as life insurance and pension related savings and investments.

Develop More Financial Products and Markets

Another issue is to develop more financial products so that investors can form diversified portfolios with more than just stocks. First, corporate bond markets should be developed, along with better enforcement of bankruptcy laws and bond rating agencies. Second, more derivative securities such as forwards, futures, and options on commodities (already in place and trading) as well as on other securities should be introduced to the market, so that investors and firms have more tools for risk management. Third, insurance companies should expand their coverage and offer more products in property and auto insurance as well as life and medical insurance, while other financial services companies should develop the market for asset-backed securities.

V. The Non-standard Financial Sector and Evidence on Hybrid Sector Firms

In this section we study how the non-standard financial sector supports firms in the Hybrid Sector to raise funds and to grow from start-ups to successful industry leaders. We also examine the alternative governance mechanisms employed by investors and firms that can substitute for formal corporate governance mechanisms. Due to data limitations, much of this evidence is by necessity anecdotal or by survey.²¹

We first compare the Hybrid Sector with the State and Listed Sectors to highlight the importance of its status in the entire economy in Section V.1. Second, we consider survey evidence

²¹ All firms including Hybrid Sector firms must disclose accounting and financial information to the local Bureau of Commerce and Industry, and most of the reports are audited. However, these data are then aggregated into the Statistical Yearbook without any firm-level publications.

in Section V.2. Finally, Section V.3 provides discussions of alternative financing channels and governance mechanisms that support the growth of the Hybrid Sector.

V.1 Comparison of Hybrid Sector vs. State and Listed Sectors

Figure 7-A compares the level and growth of *industrial output* produced in the State and Listed Sectors combined vs. that of the Hybrid Sector from 1990 to 2004. The output from the Hybrid Sector has been steadily increasing during this period and exceeded that of the other two sectors in 1998. The total output in 2004 is close to US\$1,500 billion for the Hybrid Sector, while it is around US\$800 billion in the State and Listed Sectors combined.²² The Hybrid Sector grew at an annual rate of over 14% between 1990 and 2004, while the State and Listed Sectors combined grew at around 5% during the same period.²³ In addition, the growth rates for investment in fixed assets of these sectors are comparable (*China Statistics Yearbooks*; not reported in this chapter), which implies that the Hybrid Sector is more productive than the State and Listed Sectors. In fact, with a large sample of firms with various ownership structures Liu (2007) finds that the returns to capital is much higher in non-state sectors than the State Sector, and that a capital reallocation from state to private sectors will generate more growth in the economy. Fan et al. (2006) and Li et al. (2007) find that state-owned firms in China have a much easier access to the debt market and accordingly higher leverage than non-state firms. One reason for the differences is that due to government protection (for economic and social/political reasons) the costs for bankruptcy and financial distress are much lower for state-owned firms. These firms also have easier access to bank loans, especially credit extended by state-owned banks.

All of the above facts make the growth of the Hybrid Sector even more impressive. Not surprisingly, there has been a fundamental change among the State, Listed, and Hybrid Sectors in terms of their contribution to the entire economy: the State Sector contributed more than two thirds of China's GDP in 1980, but in 2004 it contributed less than one-third of the GDP; in 1980, (non-agricultural) privately owned firms, a type of Hybrid Sector firm, were negligible, but in 2001 they contributed 33% of GDP after growing at an average rate of 20% during this period (*China Statistical*

²² Due to data limitations, our calculations underestimate the output of the State and Listed Sectors. We use the output produced by SOEs and listed firms in which the state has at least a 50% ownership stake as the total output for these sectors, but this calculation excludes output from listed firms that are *not* majority owned by the state; the output for the Hybrid Sector is the difference between the total output and the total for the other two sectors. However, as mentioned above, only around 20% of all listed firms do not have the state as the largest owner, hence the total output of these firms is not likely to change our overall conclusion on the dominance of the Hybrid Sector over the other two sectors.

²³ There is an ongoing process of privatizing SOEs. Potentially this may bias the growth rate of the Hybrid Sector higher, as there are firms shifting from the State Sector to the Hybrid Sector. However, the overwhelming majority of SOEs are transformed into the Listed Sector (the main channel through which SOEs were partially privatized prior to 2004), thus this process is unlikely to change the validity of the results above.

Yearbook, 1998-2002). The above trend of the Hybrid Sector replacing the State Sector will continue in the near future.

Insert Figures 7-A and 7-B here.

Figure 7-B presents the number and growth of non-agricultural employees in the three sectors. The Hybrid Sector is a much more important source for employment opportunities than the State and Listed Sectors. Over the period from 1990 to 2005, the Hybrid Sector employs an average of over 70% of all non-agricultural workers; the TVEs (part of the Hybrid Sector) have been the most important employers providing (non-agricultural) jobs for residents in the rural areas, while (non-agricultural) privately owned firms employ more than 40% of the workforce in the urban areas. Moreover, the number of employees working in the Hybrid Sector has been growing at 1.5% over this period, while the labor force in the State and Listed Sectors has been shrinking.²⁴ These patterns are particularly important for China, given its vast population and potential problem of unemployment.

V.2 Survey Evidence

Much of the information concerning the Hybrid Sector comes from surveys. We focus on evidence in Gregory et al. (2000), AQQ (2005a), and Cull and Xu (2005). The most important findings of these surveys regarding financing channels are the following. First, during the startup stage, funds from founders' family and friends are an important source of financing. Banks can also play an important role. Second, internal financing, in the form of retained earnings, is also important. During their growth period financing from private credit agencies (PCAs), instead of banks, as well as trade credits are important channels for firms in AQQ's sample. As documented by Tsai (2002), PCAs take on many forms, from shareholding cooperative enterprises run by professional money brokers, lenders and middlemen, to credit associations operated by a group of entrepreneurs (raising money from group members and from outsiders to fund firms; *zijin huzushe*), from pawnshops to underground private money houses.

As far as corporate governance is concerned, when asked about what type of losses concern them the most if the firm failed, every firm's founders/executives (100%) included in the AQQ study said reputation loss is a major concern, while only 60% of them said economic losses are of major concern. Competition also appears to be an important factor ensuring firms are well run.

Cull and Xu (2005) find that firms in most regions and cities rely on courts to resolve less

²⁴ Our calculations of the total number of workers employed by the Hybrid Sector actually underestimate the actual work force in the sector, because the Statistics Yearbooks do not provide employment data for all types of firms (by ownership structure) in the Hybrid Sector.

than 10% of business-related disputes (the highest percentage is 20%), with a higher reliance on courts in coastal and more developed areas. One reason that firms go to courts to resolve a dispute is because the courts are authoritative so that the dispute will be resolved even though the resolution may not be fair (e.g., Clarke et al. 2005).

V.3 Discussion on How the Non-standard Financial Sector Works

In this subsection we discuss mechanisms within the non-standard financial sector in supporting the growth of the Hybrid Sector. There are two important aspects to alternative financing channels in the Hybrid Sector. The first is the way in which investment is financed. The second is corporate governance. We consider each in turn.

Once a firm is established and doing well, internal finance can provide the funds necessary for growth. AQQ (2005a) find that about 60 percent of the funds raised by the Hybrid Sector are generated internally. Of course, internal finance is fine once a firm is established but this raises the issue of how firms in the Hybrid Sector acquire their “seed” capital, perhaps the most crucial financing during a firm’s life cycle. AQQ present evidence on the importance of alternative and informal channels, including funds from family and friends and loans from private (unofficial) credit agencies. There is also evidence that financing through illegal channels, such as smuggling, bribery, insider trading and speculations during early stages of the development of financial markets and real estate market, and other underground or unofficial businesses also play an important role in the accumulation of seed capital. Though a controversial issue for the government, our view, based on similar episodes in the history of other developing countries, is that depending on the precise nature of the activity and as long as the purpose of money making is to invest in a legitimate company, it may be more productive for the government to provide incentives for investment rather than to expend costs discovering and punishing these activities.

Perhaps the most important corporate governance mechanism is competition in product and input markets, which has worked well in both developed and developing countries (e.g., McMillan 1995, 1997; Allen and Gale 2000b). What we see from the success of Hybrid Sector firms in WenZhou and other surveyed firms recounted in AQQ, suggest that it is only those firms that have the strongest comparative advantage in an industry (of the area) that survived and thrived. A relevant factor for competition in an industry is entry barriers for new firms, as lower entry barriers foster competition. Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (DLS hereafter, 2002) examine entry barriers across 85 countries, and find that countries with heavier (lighter) regulation of entry have higher government corruption (more democratic and limited governments) and larger unofficial

economies. With much lower barriers to entry compared to other countries with similar (low) per capita GDP, China is once again an “outlier” in the DLLS sample given that China is one of the least democratic countries, and such countries tend to have high barriers to entry. Survey evidence from AQQ (2005a) reveals that there exist non-standard methods to remove entry barriers in China, which can reconcile these seemingly contradictory facts.

Another important mechanism is reputation, trust, and relationships. Greif (1989, 1993) argues that certain traders’ organizations in the 11th century were able to overcome problems of asymmetric information and the lack of legal and contract enforcement mechanisms, because they had developed institutions based on reputation, implicit contractual relations, and coalitions. Certain aspects of the growth of these institutions resemble what worked to promote commerce and the financial system in China prior to 1949 and the operation of the non-standard financial sector today, in terms of how firms raise funds and contract with investors and business partners. In addition, Greif (1993) and Stulz and Williamson (2003) point out the importance of cultural and religious beliefs for the development of institutions, legal origins, and investor protections.

The above factors are of particular relevance and importance to China’s development of institutions. Without a dominant religion, one can argue that the most important force in shaping China’s social values and institutions is the set of beliefs first developed and formalized by *Kongzi* (Confucius). This set of beliefs clearly defines family and social orders, which are very different from western beliefs on how legal codes should be formulated. Using the World Values Survey conducted in the early 1990s, LLSV (1997b) find that China has one of the highest levels of social trust among a group of 40 developed and developing countries.²⁵ We interpret high social trust in China as being influenced by Confucian beliefs. Throughout this chapter and AQQ (2005a) we have presented evidence that reputation and relationships make many financing channels and governance mechanisms work in China’s Hybrid Sector.

There are other effective corporate governance mechanisms. First, Burkart et al. (2003) link the degree of separation of ownership and control to different legal environments, and show that *family-run* firms will emerge as the dominant form of ownership structure in countries with weak minority shareholder protections, whereas professionally managed firms are the optimal form in countries with strong protection. Survey evidence on the Hybrid Sector in AQQ and empirical results on the Listed Sector, along with evidence in Claessens et al. (2000, 2002), suggests that family firms

²⁵ Interestingly, the same survey, used in LLSV (1997b), finds that Chinese citizens have a low tendency to participate in civil activities. However, our evidence shows that, with effective alternative mechanisms in place citizens in the developed regions of China have a strong incentive to participate in business/economic activities.

are a norm in China and other Asian countries, and these firms have performed well. Second, Allen and Gale (2000a) show that, if cooperation among different suppliers of inputs is necessary and all suppliers benefit from the firm doing well, then a good equilibrium with no external governance is possible, as internal, mutual monitoring can ensure the optimal outcome. AQQ (2005a) present evidence on the importance of trade credits as a form of financing for firms in the Hybrid Sector. Cooperation and mutual monitoring can ensure payments (as long as funds are available) among business partners despite the lack of external monitoring and contract enforcement. The importance of trade credits is also found in other emerging economies as well as in developed countries.

It is worth mentioning how entrepreneurs and investors alleviate and overcome problems associated with government corruption. According to proponents of institutional development (e.g., Rajan and Zingales 2003b; Acemoglu and Johnson 2005), poor institutions, weak government and powerful elites should severely hinder China's long-run economic growth.²⁶ However, our evidence shows that corruption has not prevented a high rate of growth for China's firms, in particular, firms in the Hybrid Sector, where legal protection is perhaps weaker and problems of corruption worse compared to firms in the State and Listed sectors. One of the most effective solutions for corruption for firms in this sector is the common goal of sharing high prospective profits, which aligns interests of government officials with those of entrepreneurs and investors. Under this common goal in a multi-period setting, implicit contractual agreements and reputation can act as enforcement mechanisms to ensure that all parties, including government officials, fulfill their roles to make the firm successful. Another potential effective solution for corruption is competition among local governments/bureaucrats from different regions within the same country. Entrepreneurs can move from region to region to find the most supportive government officials for their private firms, which in turn motivates officials to lend "helping hands" rather than "grabbing hands" in the provision of public goods or services (e.g., granting of licenses to start-up firms), or else there will be an outflow of profitable private businesses from the region (Allen and Qian 2007). This remedy should be typically available in a large country with diverse regions like China.

In addition, the selection and promotion process of government officials also plays a role in curbing the damaging effects of corruption. As Li (1998) points out, starting in the early 1980s, the central government of China implemented a mandatory retirement age for almost all bureaucrats at various levels, which made officials younger and more familiar with capitalist ideas. During the

²⁶ In a broader context, LLSV (1999) find that governments in countries with French or socialist origins have lower quality (in terms of supporting economic growth) than those with English common laws and richer countries. But clearly China is a counterexample to LLSV's argument on government.

early stages of China's reform, TVEs, in which local governments were partial owners, provided the most important source of growth in the Hybrid Sector. The enormous success of TVEs and the promotion of the associated officials provided examples and incentives to other officials to follow suit. In addition, one of the key yardsticks in measuring the performance of local officials by the central government is economic growth and the amount of investment from non-local sources. These policies encourage inter-regional competition among officials and induce more government goods and services supplied and higher levels of growth.

VI. Financial Crises

Financial crises often accompany the development of a financial system. Conventional wisdom says that financial crises are bad. Often they are very bad, as they disrupt production and lower social welfare as in the Great Depression in the U.S. Hoggarth et al. (2002) carefully measure the costs of a wide range of recent financial crises and find that these costs are on average roughly 15-20 percent of GDP. It is these large costs that make policymakers so averse to financial crises.

It is important to point out, however, that financial crises may be welfare improving for an economy. One possible example is the late nineteenth century U.S., which experienced many crises but at the same time had a high long run growth rate. In fact, Ranciere et al. (2003) report an empirical observation that countries which have experienced occasional crises have grown on average faster than countries without crises. They develop an endogenous growth model and show theoretically that an economy may be able to attain higher growth when firms are encouraged by a limited bailout policy to take more credit risk in the form of currency mismatch, even though the country may experience occasional crises (see Allen and Oura (2004) for a review of the growth and crises literature and Allen and Gale (2004a) who show that crises can be optimal).

In this section, we consider financial crises in China. Given China's current situation with limited currency mismatches any crisis that occurs is likely to be a classic banking, currency or twin crisis. It is perhaps more likely to be of the damaging type that disrupts the economy and social stability than of the more benign type that aids growth. The desirability of preventing crises thus needs to be taken into account when considering reforms of China's financial system. First, we examine how China can prevent traditional financial crises, including a banking sector crisis and a stock market or real estate crisis/crash. We then discuss how China should be better prepared for new types of financial crises, such as the "twin crises" (simultaneous foreign exchange and banking/stock market crises) that occurred in many Asian economies in the late 1990s.

VI.1 Banking Crises and Market Crashes

Among traditional financial crises, banking panics, arising from the banks' lack of liquid assets to meet total withdrawal demands (anticipated and unanticipated), were often particularly disruptive. Over time one of the most important roles of central banks came to be the elimination of banking panics and the maintenance of financial stability. To a large degree central banks in different countries performed well in this regard in the period following the Second World War. However, in recent years, banking crises are often preceded by abnormal price rises ("bubbles") in the real estate or stock markets. At some point the bubble bursts and assets markets collapse. In many cases banks and other intermediaries are overexposed to the equity and real estate markets, and following the collapse of asset markets a banking crisis ensues. Allen and Gale (2000c) provide a theory of bubbles and crises based on the existence of an agency problem. Many investors in real estate and stock markets obtain their investment funds from external sources. If the providers of the funds are unable to observe the characteristics of the investment, and because of the investors' limited liability, there is a classic risk-shifting problem (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Risk shifting increases the return to risky assets and causes investors to bid up asset prices above their fundamental values. A crucial determinant for asset prices is the amount of credit that is provided for speculative investment. Financial liberalization, by expanding the volume of credit, can interact with the agency problem and lead to a bubble in asset prices.

As discussed above in Section III, if NPLs continue to accumulate and/or if growth slows significantly then there may be a banking crisis in China. This may involve withdrawal of funds from banks. However, given the government's strong position regarding the low level of debt (Table 3-A), it should be possible for the government to prevent this situation from getting out of control. Since the real estate markets in Shanghai (largest volume and most developed) and other major cities have already experienced bubbles and crashes (see *China Industry Report*, <http://www.cei.gov.cn>, and <http://house.focus.cn> for more details), it is quite possible that similar episodes in the future could cause a banking crisis that will be more damaging to the real economy. With booming real estate markets, there will be more speculative money poured into properties with a large amount coming from banks. The agency problem in real estate lending and investment mentioned above worsens this problem. If the real estate market falls significantly within a short period of time, defaults on bank loans could be large enough to trigger a banking panic and crisis. This perhaps represents the most serious risk of a financial crisis in China.

VI.2 Capital Account Liberalization, Currency Float, and Twin Crises

After the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in early 1970s, a new breed of financial crisis emerged. Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal (1996) found that three quarters of the IMF's member countries suffered some form of banking crisis between 1980 and 1996, and their study did not include the subsequent Asian financial crisis in 1997. In many of these crises, banking panics in the traditional sense were avoided either by central bank intervention or by explicit or implicit government guarantees. But as Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) find, the advent of financial liberalization in many economies in the 1980s, in which free capital in- and out-flows and the entrance and competition from foreign investors and financial institutions follow in the home country, has often led to "twin" banking and currency crises. A common precursor to these crises was financial liberalization and significant credit expansion and subsequent stock market crashes and banking crises. In emerging markets this is often then accompanied by an exchange rate crisis as governments choose between lowering interest rates to ease the banking crises or raising them to defend the home currency. Finally, a significant fall in output occurs and the economies enter recessions.

Liberalization of the Capital Account and Financial Sector

Capital account liberation can attract more foreign capital, but large scale and sudden capital flows and foreign speculation significantly increase the likelihood of a twin crisis. The first key question is, when and to what extent should a country open its capital account and financial sector to foreign capital and foreign financial institutions? The prevailing view, expressed by McKinnon (1991), Dornbusch (1998), and Fischer (1998), is that success or failure of this policy hinges on the efficiency of domestic financial institutions, and that reforming the financial sector should be a precondition to liberalizing. This latter view assumes that financial liberalization does not alter the efficiency of domestic financial institutions. But this policy change affects both the supply and price of capital, two important determinants of lending contracts. With a model of endogenous financial intermediation, Alessandria and Qian (2005) demonstrate that an efficient financial sector prior to liberalization is neither necessary nor sufficient for a successful financial liberalization.

Applying these ideas to China, even though the overall efficiency of China's banking sector (especially state-owned banks) is low compared to international standards, banks can have a stronger incentive to limit the moral hazard concerning borrowers' choices of investment projects through monitoring and designing of loan contracts (e.g., adjusting interest rates and/or maturities) following a capital account liberalization. Therefore, the efficiency of the banking sector improves and the liberalization can generate a large welfare increase, since it leads to both a larger scale of investment

and a better composition of investment projects. This is more likely to occur with low interest rates in international markets (so that cost of capital for domestic banks is also low). A financial sector liberalization, which allows foreign financial institutions to enter China's lending markets, can further improve welfare as more competition provides stronger incentives for all banks to further discourage moral hazard in investment. As long as the adverse selection problem (entrance of borrowers with negative-NPV projects in the markets; can become worse with more competition in the banking sector) is not severe, financial sector liberalization will further improve welfare. Overall, we conclude that a liberalization of the capital account is likely to be beneficial for China as long as the (post-liberalization) cost of capital for Chinese banks does not rise sharply.

Currency Crisis and Banking Crisis (A Twin Crisis)

A currency crisis that may trigger a banking crisis is a possibility. The rapid increase in foreign exchange reserves in recent years suggests there is a lot of speculative money in China in anticipation of an RMB revaluation. If there is a significant future revaluation or if after some time it becomes clear there will not be one then much of this money may be withdrawn. What happens then will depend on how the government and central bank respond. If they allow the currency to float so they do not use up the exchange reserves then any falls in the value of the RMB may occur quickly and this may limit further outflows. If they try to limit the exchange rate movement then there may be a classic currency crisis. This in turn may trigger a banking crisis if there are large withdrawals from banks as a result. Quickly adopting a full float and avoiding a twin crisis would be preferable.²⁷

Financial Contagion

Another phenomenon that has been important in many recent crises (e.g., the 1997 Asian crisis) is that financial crises are contagious. A small shock that initially affects only a particular region or sector can spread by contagion within the banking system or asset markets to the rest of the financial sector, then to the entire economy and possibly other economies. Contagion can occur in a number of ways. In the Chinese context where financial markets are relatively unimportant it is most likely they will occur either from contractually interconnected financial institutions or large asset price movements that cause spillovers to financial institutions.

Allen and Gale (2000d) focus on the channel of contagion that arises from the overlapping

²⁷ Chang and Velasco (2001) develop a model of twin crises based on the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model of bank runs. Money enters agents' utility function, and the central bank controls the ratio of currency to consumption. In some regimes, there exists both a "good" equilibrium in which early (late) consumers receive the proceeds from short-term (long-term) assets, and a "bad" equilibrium in which everybody believes a crisis will occur and these beliefs are self-fulfilling. If the bad equilibrium occurs, there is a twin crisis.

claims that different regions or sectors of the banking system have on one another through interbank markets. When one region suffers a banking crisis, the other regions suffer a loss because their claims on the troubled region fall in value. If this spillover effect is strong enough, it can cause a crisis in the adjacent regions, and a contagion can occur which brings down the entire financial system. Allen and Gale (2004b) show how large price falls can come about as a result of forced liquidations when there is a limited supply of liquidity in the market. Cifuentes et al. (2005) show that contagion is likely to be particularly severe when these two factors interact.

Insert Table 7 here.

Given China's current financial system, what is the likelihood of financial contagion caused by contractual interlinkages as in the interbank market or because of a meltdown in asset prices if there are forced sales? China's interbank market grew very quickly since its inception in 1981; in fact, the growth of this market was so fast, with the participation of many unregulated financial institutions and with large amount of flows of funds through this market to fixed asset investment, that it exacerbated high inflation in the late 1980s. Since then the government and PBOC increased their regulation by limiting participation of non-bank financial institutions and by imposing restrictions on interest rate movements. In 1996 a nation-wide, uniform system of interbank markets was set up. It contains two connected levels: the primary network, which includes the largest PBOC branches, large commercial banks, and a few large non-bank financial institutions, and the secondary network that includes many banks and non-bank institutions and their local branches (see *China Interbank Market Annual Reports* for more details). Table 7 documents the growth of the interbank market in recent years: while the trading volume of long maturity contracts (20 days or longer) is low, the volume of short-term contracts (overnight and week-long) has been high (reaching RMB 1 trillion to 2 trillion, or \$125 billion to \$250 billion). Therefore, the increasing interlinkages can potentially create a contagion should a crisis develops in one area or sector.

With regard to a meltdown of asset prices, this can happen because of a limited supply of liquidity if there is a rapid liquidation of assets. It seems unlikely that this can occur and cause a serious problem in China's securities markets. A more serious threat is real estate markets if there are bankruptcies and forced selling. This could potentially interact with bank interlinkages and cause a systemic problem. As mentioned above, a crash in real estate markets is very likely the cause of a financial crisis in China.

VII. Summary and Concluding Remarks

One of the most frequently asked questions about China's financial system is whether it will stimulate or hamper its economic growth. Our answer to this question, based on examining the history and current status of the financial system and comparing them to those of other countries, is in four parts. First, the large but inefficient banking sector has been the dominant force in the financial system, and has played an important role in funding the growth of many types of firms. It is currently plagued by the problem of NPLs, which, if not corrected properly, may cause major economic difficulties. Second, the stock market has been growing fast since 1990, but has played a relatively limited role in supporting the growth of the economy. However, the role of the financial markets is likely to change in the near future and they will play an increasingly important role in the economy.

If we can summarize that the role of the banking sector and financial markets has been that they have done enough *not* to slow down the growth of the economy, our third conclusion is that alternative financing channels have had great success in supporting the growth of the Hybrid Sector, which contributes most of the economic growth compared to the State and Listed Sectors. The non-standard financial sector relies on alternative financing channels including internal finance, and on alternative governance mechanisms, such as those based on trust, reputation and relationships, and competition to support the growth of the Hybrid Sector. Going forward, we believe that these alternative financing channels and governance mechanisms should be encouraged rather than replaced. They should be allowed to co-exist with the banks and markets and continue to fuel the growth of the Hybrid Sector.

We conclude by pointing out the most significant challenge for improving China's financial system: Economic stability is crucial for the continuing development of the Chinese economy, and the stability of the financial system relates to economic stability in three dimensions. The continuing effort to reduce and eventually bring down NPLs to normal levels is important in avoiding a banking crisis, while the effort to improve the regulatory environment surrounding the financial markets (including governance and accounting standards) can certainly help prevent a stock market crash/crisis. If China opens the capital account, there will be a large inflow of foreign capital, but large scale capital flows and speculations also bring the risk of a twin crisis (foreign exchange and banking/stock market crisis), which severely damaged emerging economies in Asia in 1997. In order to guard against such a crisis, policies toward improving the financial system must be made along with supportive fiscal and trade policies.

References

1. Alessandria, George, and Jun Qian, 2005. "Endogenous Financial Intermediation and Real Effects of Capital Account Liberalization," *Journal of International Economics* 67, 97-128.
2. Allen, Franklin, Michael Chui, and Angela Maddaloni, 2004. "Financial Systems in Europe, the USA, and Asia," *Oxford Review of Economy Policy* 20, 490-508.
3. _____, and Douglas Gale, 1999. "Diversity of Opinion and Financing of New Technologies," *Journal of Financial Intermediation* 8, 68-89.
4. _____, and _____, 2000a. *Comparing Financial Systems*, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
5. _____, and _____, 2000b. "Corporate Governance and Competition," in *Corporate Governance: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives*, Xavier Vives, ed., Cambridge University Press, London, 23-94.
6. _____, and _____, 2000c. "Bubbles and Crises," *Economic Journal* 110, 236-255.
7. _____, and _____, 2000d. "Financial Contagion," *Journal of Political Economy* 108, 1-33.
8. _____, and _____, 2004a, "Financial Intermediaries and Markets" (with D. Gale) *Econometrica* 72, 1023-1061.
9. _____, and _____, 2004b, "Financial Fragility, Liquidity and Asset Prices" (with D. Gale), *Journal of the European Economic Association* 2, 1015-1048.
10. _____, and Hiroko Oura, 2004. "Sustained Economic Growth and the Financial System," *Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan*, 22 S-1, 95-119.
11. _____, and Jun Qian, 2007. "Corruption and Competition," working paper, University of Pennsylvania.
12. _____, _____, and Meijun Qian, 2005a. "Law, Finance, and Economic Growth in China," *Journal of Financial Economics* 77, 57-116.
13. _____, _____, and _____, 2005b. "China's Financial System: Past, Present, and Future," Wharton Financial Institutions Center Working Paper # 05-17.
14. Berger, Allen, Iftekhar Hasan, and Mingming Zhou, 2006. "Bank Ownership and Efficiency in China: What will Happen in the World's Largest Nation?" working paper, <http://ssrn.com/abstract=924246>.
15. Black, Bernard S. and Ronald J. Gilson, 1998. "Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets: Bank versus Stock Markets," *Journal of Financial Economics* 47, 243-277.
16. Brandt, Loren, and Xiaodong Zhu, 2000. "Redistribution in a Decentralized Economy: Growth and Inflation in China under Reform," *Journal of Political Economy* 108, 422-439.
17. Burkart, Mike, Fausto Panunzi, and Andrei Shleifer, 2003. "Family Firms," *Journal of Finance* 58, 2167-2201.
18. Chan, Kalok, Albert Menkveld, and Zhishu Yang, 2007. "Information Asymmetry and Asset Prices: Evidence from the China Foreign Share Discount," forthcoming, *Journal of Finance*.

19. Chang, Roberto, and Andres Velasco, 2001. "A Model of Financial Crises in Emerging Markets," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 116, 489-518.
20. Che, Jiahua, and Yingyi Qian, 1998. "Insecure property rights and government ownership of firms," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 113, 467-496.
21. Cifuentes, Rodrigo, Gianluigi Ferrucci, and Hyun Song Shin, 2005, "Liquidity Risk and Contagion," *Journal of the European Economic Association* 3, 556-566.
22. Claessens, Stijn, Simeon Djankov, and Larry Lang, 2000. "The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations," *Journal of Financial Economics* 58, 81-112.
23. _____, _____, Joseph Fan, and, and Larry Lang, 2002. "Expropriation of Minority Shareholders in East Asia," *Journal of Finance* 57, 2741-2771.
24. Clarke, Donald, Peter Murrell, and Susan Whiting, 2005. "Law, Property Rights and Institutions," book chapter to appear in "The Transition that Worked: Origins, Mechanism, and Consequences of China's Long Boom," edited by L. Brandt and T. Rawski.
25. Cull, Robert, and Colin Xu, 2005. "Institutions, Ownership, and Finance: The Determinants of Reinvestments of Profit among Chinese Firms," *Journal of Financial Economics* 77, 117-146.
26. Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli, and Ross Levine, 2001. *Financial Structure and Economic Growth: Cross-country Comparisons of Banks, Markets, and Development*, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
27. Diamond, Douglas, and Philip Dybvig, 1983. "Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity," *Journal of Political Economy* 91, 401-419.
28. Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., 2002. "The Regulation of Entry," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 117, 1-37.
29. Dornbusch, Rudiger, 1998. "Capital Controls: An Idea Whose Time is Past," *Princeton Essays in International Finance* No. 207.
30. Fan, Joseph, Oliver Rui, and Mengxin Zhao, 2006. "Rent Seeking and Corporate Finance: Evidence from Corruption," working paper, Chinese University of Hong Kong.
31. _____, T.J. Wong, and Tianyu Zhang 2007. "Politically-connected CEOs, Corporate Governance and Post-IPO Performance of China's Partially Privatized Firms," forthcoming, *Journal of Financial Economics*.
32. Feldstein, Martin, 1999. "Social Security Pension Reform in China," *China Economic Review* 10, 99-107.
33. _____, 2003. "Banking, Budgets, and Pensions: Some Priorities for Chinese Policy," mimeo, Harvard University.
34. _____, and Jeffrey Liebman, 2006. "Realizing the Potential of China's Social Security Pension System," *China Economic Review* 17.
35. Feng, Lei, and Mark Seasholes, 2004. "Correlated Trading and Location," *Journal of Finance* 59, 2117-2144.

36. Fischer, Stanley. 1998. "Capital Account Liberalization and the Role of the IMF," *Princeton Essays on International Finance* No. 207.
37. Franks, Julian, Colin Mayer, and Stefano Rossi, 2003. "Ownership: Evolution and Regulation," working paper, London Business School.
38. Frye, T., and Andrei Shleifer, 1997. "The Invisible Hand and Grabbing Hand," *American Economic Review* 87, 354-358.
39. Fung, Peter, Michael Firth, and Oliver Rui, 2003. "Corporate Governance and CEO Compensation in China," working paper, Chinese University of Hong Kong.
40. Gordon, Roger, and Wei Li, 2003. "Government as Discriminating Monopolist in the Financial Market: The Case of China," *Journal of Public Economics* 87, 283-312.
41. Gregory, Neil, Stoyan Tenev, and Dileep Wagle, 2000. *China's Emerging Private Enterprises: Prospects for the New Century*, IFC (World Bank), Washington, D.C.
42. Greif, Avner, 1989. "Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders," *Journal of Economic History* 49, 857-882.
43. _____, 1993. "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders' Coalition," *American Economic Review* 83, 525-548.
44. Herring, Richard, and N. Chatusripitak, 2000. "The Case of the Missing Market: The Bond Market and Why it Matters for Financial Development," working paper, Wharton Financial Institutions Center.
45. Hoggarth, Glenn, Ricardo Reis, and Victoria Saporta (2002), "Costs of Banking System Instability: Some Empirical Evidence," *Journal of Banking and Finance* 26, 825-855.
46. Jeng, Leslie A., and Philippe C. Wells, 2000. "The Determinants of Venture Capital Funding: Evidence across Countries," *Journal of Corporate Finance* 6, 241-289.
47. Jensen, Michael, and William Meckling, 1976. "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure," *Journal of Financial Economics* 3, 305-360.
48. Kaminsky, Graciela, and Carmen Reinhart, 1999. "The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking and Balance-of-payments Problems," *American Economic Review* 89, 473-500.
49. Kane, Edward, 1989. *The S&L Mess: How Did It Happen?* Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute Press.
50. _____, 2003. "What Economic Principles Should Policymakers in Other Countries Have Learned from the S&L Mess?" *Business Economics* 38, 21-30.
51. Kato, Takao, and Cheryl Long, 2004. "Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in China," William Davidson Institute Working Paper No. 690.
52. Kirby, William, 1995. "China Unincorporated: Company Law and Business Enterprise in Twentieth-Century China," *Journal of Asian Studies* 54, 43-63.
53. Kortum, Samuel, and Josh Lerner, 2000. "Assessing the Contribution of Venture Capital on Innovation," *RAND Journal of Economics* 31, 674-692.

54. La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., 2002. "Government Ownership of Banks," *Journal of Finance* 57, 265-302.
55. _____, _____, and _____, 2006. "What Works in Securities Laws?" *Journal of Finance* 61, 1-32.
56. _____, _____, _____, and Robert Vishny, 1997a. "Legal Determinants of External Finance," *Journal of Finance* 52, 1131-1150.
57. _____, _____, _____, and _____, 1997b. "Trust in Large Organizations," *American Economic Review* 87, 333-338.
58. _____, _____, _____, and _____, 1998, "Law and Finance," *Journal of Political Economy* 106, 1113-1155.
59. _____, _____, _____, and _____, 1999. "The Quality of Government," *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 15, 222-279.
60. _____, _____, _____, and _____, 2000a, "Investor Protection and Corporate Governance," *Journal of Financial Economics* 58, 141-186.
61. _____, _____, _____, and _____, 2000b, "Agency Problems and Dividend Policy around the World," *Journal of Finance* 55, 1-34.
62. _____, _____, _____, and _____, 2002. "Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation," *Journal of Finance* 57, 1147-1170.
63. Lardy, Nicholas R., 1998. *China's Unfinished Economic Revolution*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C.
64. Lau, Lawrence, Yingyi Qian, and Gerard Roland, 2000. "Reform without Losers: An Interpretation of China's Dual-Track Approach to Transition," *Journal of Political Economy* 108, 120-143.
65. Lee, Tahirih V., 1993. "Risky Business: Courts, Culture, and the Marketplace," *University of Miami Law Review* 47, 1335-1414.
66. Levine, Ross, 2002. "Bank-based or Market-based Financial Systems: Which is Better?" *Journal of Financial Intermediation* 11, 1-30.
67. Li, David, 1996. "A Theory of Ambiguous Property Rights: The Case of the Chinese Non-state Sector," *Journal of Comparative Economics* 23, 1-19.
68. _____, 1998. "Changing Incentives of the Chinese Bureaucracy," *American Economic Review* 88, 393-397.
69. Li, Kai, Heng Yue and Longkai Zhao, 2007. "Ownership, Institutions, and Capital Structure: Evidence from Non-listed Chinese Firms," working paper, University of British Columbia.
70. Lindgren, C., G. Garcia, and M. Saal, 1996. *Bank Soundness and Macroeconomic Policy*, Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund.
71. Liu, Qiao, 2007. "Institutions, Financial Development, and Corporate Investment: Evidence from an Implied Return on Capital in China," working paper, University of Hong Kong.

72. McKinnon, R., 1991. *The Order of Economic Liberalization*, Johns Hopkins University Press.
73. McMillan, John, 1995. "China's Nonconformist Reform," *Economic Transition in Eastern Europe and Russia: Realities of Reform*, ed. Edward Lazear, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 419-433.
74. _____, 1997. "Markets in Transition," Ch.6 of *Advances in Economics and Econometrics* Vol. 2, David M. Kreps, and Kenneth F. Wallis, eds., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 210-239.
75. _____, and Barry Naughton, 1992. "How to Reform a Planned Economy: Lessons from China," *Oxford Review of Economic Policy* 8, 130-143.
76. Mei, Jianping, Jose Scheinkman, and Wei Xiong, 2003. "Speculative Trading and Stock Prices: An Analysis of Chinese A-B Share Premia," working paper, Princeton University.
77. Michie, R., 1987. *The London and New York Stock Exchanges 1850-1914*, London: Allen & Unwin.
78. Morck, Randall, Bernard Yeung, and Wayne Yu, 2000. "The Information Content of Stock Markets: Why do Emerging Markets Have Synchronous Stock Price Movement?" *Journal of Financial Economics* 58, 215-260.
79. Orts, Eric, 2001. "The Rule of Law in China," *Vanderbilt Journal of Transitional Law* 34, 43-115.
80. Park, Albert, Loren Brandt, and John Giles, 2003. "Competition under Credit Rationing: Theory and Evidence from Rural China," *Journal of Development Economics* 71, 463-495.
81. Prasad, Eswar and Shang-Jin Wei, 2005. "The Chinese Approach to Capital Flows: Patterns and Possible Explanations," forthcoming in *Capital Controls and Capital Flows in Emerging Economies*, ed. Sebastian Edwards, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
82. Qiu, Yuemin, Bing Li, and Youcai Cai, 2000. "Losses of State-Owned Commercial Banks: Reasons and Policy Response," *Jingji gongzuozhe xuexi ziliao* [Study Materials for Economic Workers], no. 44.
83. Ranciere, R., A. Tornell, and F. Westermann, (2003). "Crises and Growth: A Re-evaluation," NBER Working Paper 10073.
84. Rawski, Thomas, 2002. "Measuring China's recent GDP growth: where do we stand?" *China Economic Quarterly* 2, 3-14.
85. Sachs, J., Woo, W., 1997. "Understanding China's Economic Performance," NBER working paper 5935.
86. Schipani, Cindy, and Junhai Liu, 2002. "Corporate Governance in China: Then and Now," *Columbia Business Law Review*, Vol. 2002, 1-69.
87. Stulz, Rene, and Rohan Williamson, 2003. "Culture, Openness, and Finance," *Journal of Financial Economics* 70, 261-300.
88. Tenev, Stoyan, Chunlin Zhang, and Loup Brefort, 2002. *Corporate Governance and Enterprise Reform in China: Building the institutions of Modern Market*, IFC (World Bank), Washington, D.C.
89. Tsai, Kellee, 2002. *Back-alley Banking*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

**Table 1 A Comparison of Financial Systems: Bank- vs. Market-based Measures
(Value-weighted approach)**

	Measures	English Origin *	French Origin *	German Origin *	Scandinavian origin *	Sample average	China (2002)
Bank and Market size	Bank credit/GDP	0.62	0.55	0.99	0.49	0.73	1.11 (0.24)^a
	Overhead Cost/Bank Total Assets	0.04	0.05	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.12
	Market Cap/GDP ^b	0.58	0.18	0.55	0.25	0.47	0.32
	Float supply of Market Cap/GDP ^b	0.31	0.07	0.37	0.08	0.27	0.11
Structure Indices: Markets vs. banks^{**}	Structure Activity	-0.76	-2.03	-1.14	-1.83	-1.19	-1.07 (0.46)^a
	Structure Size	-0.10	-1.05	-0.77	-0.69	-0.55	-1.24 (0.29)^a
	Structure Efficiency	-4.69	-6.00	-5.17	-6.17	-5.17	-1.48 (-3.07)
	Structure regulatory	7.02	8.21	10.15	7.72	8.95	16
Financial Development^{***} (Banking and market sectors combined)	Finance activity	-1.18	-3.38	-0.84	-2.86	-1.58	-0.85 (-2.38)
	Finance size	5.10	4.29	5.22	4.60	4.95	-1.02 (-2.55)^a
	Finance efficiency	2.18	0.44	2.85	1.04	2.01	-0.60 (1.14)

Notes: All the measures for countries other than China are from Levine (2002); measures on China are calculated using definitions from Levine (2002)

*: The numerical results for countries of each legal origin group is calculated based on a value- (GDP of each country) weighted approach; **: measuring whether a country's financial system is market- or bank-dominated, the higher the measure, the more the system is dominated by markets – see text for definitions; ***: these variables measure the entire financial system (banking and market sectors combined), and the higher the measure, the larger or more efficient the financial system is;

^a: numbers in brackets indicate bank credit issued to the Hybrid Sector of China (instead of total bank credit);

^b: the “floating supply” of the market is a better measure for the size of a stock market (relative to size of the economy) than “market capitalization,” because the latter includes non-tradable shares while the former measures the fraction of total market capitalization that is traded in the markets;

Sources: Almanac of China's Finance and Banking (2000-2002); China Statistical Yearbook (2000-2002).

Table 2-A Comparisons of Total Savings and Deposits (in US\$ billions)

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
<i>China</i>						
Gross domestic saving*	373	386	391	421	447	487
Gross domestic saving/GDP (%)	41.5%	40.8%	39.5%	39.0%	38.5%	39.4%
Demand deposits ^a	--	--	60	71	127	109
Savings deposits ^b	--	--	720	777	891	1,050
Time deposits ^c	--	--	114	136	171	199
<i>Japan</i>						
Gross domestic saving*	--	--	742	641	577	603
Gross domestic saving/GDP (%)	--	--	14.8%	14.3%	13.8%	13.3%
Demand deposits ^a	152	181	220	227	211	259
Savings deposits ^b	105	127	138	117	91	--
Time deposits ^c	2,161	2,540	2,724	2,392	1,821	1,934
<i>South Korea</i>						
Gross domestic saving*	108	126	141	135	127	147
Gross domestic saving/GDP (%)	33.7%	34.4%	33.5%	32.6%	30.9%	29.3%
Demand deposits ^a	25	31	37	35	38	47
Savings deposits ^b	48	81	117	123	144	173
Time deposits ^c	33	96	128	163	162	212
<i>India</i>						
Gross domestic saving*	90	88	107	105	114	120
Gross domestic saving/GDP (%)	23.1%	21.5%	24.1%	23.4%	24.0%	24.0%
Demand deposits ^a	26	28	29	30	31	35
Time deposits ^c	126	140	158	175	197	231

Source: The Asian Banker data center 2003, <http://www.theasianbanker.com>.

Notes: *: Gross Domestic savings, from the national accounts, is an annual flow measure; ^a: Demand deposits, balance of the accounts can be withdrawn on demand of customers (e.g., check writing); ^b: Savings deposits, interest-bearing accounts that can be withdrawn but not to be used as money (e.g., no check writing, M2); ^c: Time deposits, savings accounts or CD with a fixed term (M2).

Table 2-B Breakdown of Bank Loans (end-of-year figures in RMB billions)

Year	Total Loans	Short-term Loans	Industrial Loans	Commercial Loans	Infrastructure Construction Loans	Agricultural Loans	Loans to TVEs	Privately Owned Firms	Joint Ventures & Cooperative Firms
1994	3,997.60	2,694.87	994.83	1,050.98	61.72	114.39	200.24	15.59	79.23
1995	5,054.41	3,337.20	1,177.47	1,283.71	79.93	154.48	251.49	19.62	99.91
1996	6,115.66	4,021.00	1,421.33	1,533.26	97.38	191.91	282.19	27.98	134.63
1997	7,491.41	5,541.83	1,652.66	1,835.66	159.11	331.46	503.58	38.67	189.10
1998	8,652.41	6,061.32	1,782.15	1,975.24	162.87	444.42	558.00	47.16	248.75
1999	9,373.43	6,388.76	1,794.89	1,989.09	147.69	479.24	616.13	57.91	298.58
2000	9,937.11	6,574.81	1,701.93	1,786.85	161.71	488.90	606.08	65.46	304.98
2001	11,231.47	6,732.72	1,863.67	1,856.34	209.96	571.15	641.30	91.80	326.35
2002	13,129.39	7,424.79	2,019.05	1,797.31	274.80	688.46	681.23	105.88	269.74
2003	15,899.62	8,366.12	2,275.60	1,799.44	300.21	841.14	766.16	146.16	256.94
2004	17,819.78	8,684.06	2,389.66	1,707.41	278.01	984.31	806.92	208.16	219.84
2005	30,204.28	8,744.92	2,251.67	1,644.76	298.37	1,152.99	790.18	218.08	197.53

Source: Statistical Yearbooks of China, (1985 – 2006).

Table 3-A A Comparison of Non-performing Loans (NPLs) and Government Debt

This table compares total outstanding NPLs within the banking system, government debt, and the ratio of (NPLs + Government Debt)/GDP among China, the U.S., and other major Asian countries for the period 1997-2006. Panel A presents the size of the NPLs, as measured by US\$ billion and as the percentage of GDPs in the same year. NPLs in the U.S. measure the outstanding “delinquency loan”; NPLs in Japan measure the “risk management loans” (or loans disclosed under the Financial Reconstructed Law and/or loans subject to self-assessment). In Panel B, outstanding government debt is measured at the end of each year; for the U.S. and Japan, total government debt includes domestic and foreign debt. In Panel C, the ratios for China include using the official NPL numbers and using doubled official NPLs (i.e., the ratios in the brackets are (doubled NPLs + government debt)/GDP); the ratios in the brackets for the U.S. and Japan are (net government debt + NPLs)/GDP, where net government debt is the difference between government borrowing (stock measure) and government lending (flow measure). All figures are converted into U.S. dollars using the average exchange rate within the observation year.

Year	China	U.S.	Japan	S. Korea	India	Indonesia	Taiwan
Panel A: Size of NPLs: In US\$ billion and as percentage of GDPs in the same year (in brackets)							
1997	--	66.9 (0.8%)	217.4 (5.1%)	16.2 (3.1%)	--	0.2 (0.1%)	19.6 (6.5%)
1998	20.5 (2.0%)	71.3 (0.8%)	489.7 (12.7%)	23.2 (6.7%)	12.7 (3.1%)	5.5 (5.2%)	21.8 (7.9%)
1999	105.1 (9.7%)	72.2 (0.8%)	547.6 (12.6%)	54.4 (12.2%)	14.0 (3.2%)	3.1 (3.8%)	27.2 (9.1%)
2000	269.3 (22.5%)	90.1 (0.9%)	515.4 (11.1%)	35.5 (6.9%)	12.9 (2.8%)	6.3 (2.7%)	33.2 (10.3%)
2001	265.3 (20.0%)	108.4 (1.1%)	640.1 (15.6%)	12.2 (2.5%)	13.2 (2.8%)	4.3 (1.7%)	37.9 (13.0%)
2002	188.4 (13.0%)	107.8 (1.0%)	552.5 (14.1%)	9.9 (1.8%)	14.8 (3.0%)	3.3 (2.0%)	30.7 (10.4%)
2003	181.2 (11.0%)	95.9 (1.0%)	480.1 (11.3%)	11.7 (1.9%)	14.6 (2.5%)	4.7 (1.5%)	23.1 (7.7%)
2004	207.4 (10.7%)	81.3 (0.9%)	334.8 (7.3%)	10.0 (1.5%)	14.4 (2.2%)	3.8 (2.1%)	16.4 (5.1%)
2005	164.2 (7.3%)	84.6 (0.7%)	183.3 (4.0%)	7.6 (1.0%)	13.4 (1.7%)	6.0 (1.5%)	11.2 (3.2%)
2006 (Q2)	160.3 (6.3%)	88.8 (0.7%)	108.2 (2.4%)	7.4 (0.8%)	11.8 (1.4%)	7.3 (2.1%)	--
Panel B: Outstanding Government Debt (\$ billion)							
	Outstanding Government Bond	Total Government Debt	Total Government Debt	Outstanding Treasury Bonds	Total Public Debt	Outstanding Government Bond	Outstanding Government Bond
1997	66.5	5,802.8	4254.0	5.3	--	--	--
1998	93.8	5,788.8	4858.0	14.4	178.4	--	--
1999	127.3	5,822.7	6053.1	28.5	260.2	34.1	46.5
2000	165.1	5,612.7	6209.8	32.7	232.4	45.1	45.5
2001	188.6	5,734.4	6036.0	39.8	225.4	43.5	58.7
2002	233.5	6,169.4	6321.3	45.2	250.2	42.1	77.7
2003	273.0	6,789.7	6852.9	67.9	259.7	48.0	75.7
2004	311.3	7,335.6	7446.6	107.0	299.6	44.7	85.2
2005	350.0	7,809.5	8299.5	165.5	347.1	39.9	--
2006	--	8,289.1	7880.5	209.1	378.9	44.8	--
Panel C: (NPLs + Outstanding Government Debt)/GDP							
1997	--	0.71 (0.54)	1.05 (0.40)	0.04	--	--	--
1998	0.11 (0.13)	0.67 (0.50)	1.39 (0.63)	0.11	0.46	--	--
1999	0.21 (0.31)	0.64 (0.45)	1.51 (0.64)	0.19	0.62	0.24	0.25
2000	0.36 (0.59)	0.58 (0.40)	1.45 (0.65)	0.13	0.53	0.31	0.24
2001	0.34 (0.54)	0.58 (0.39)	1.63 (0.83)	0.11	0.50	0.30	0.33
2002	0.29 (0.42)	0.60 (0.42)	1.76 (0.90)	0.10	0.54	0.23	0.37
2003	0.28 (0.39)	0.63 (0.45)	1.73 (0.86)	0.13	0.48	0.22	0.33
2004	0.27 (0.38)	0.63 (0.46)	1.70 (0.81)	0.17	0.47	0.19	0.32
2005	0.23 (0.30)	0.63 (0.47)	1.86 (0.84)	0.22	0.47	0.16	--
2006	--	0.63 (0.47)	1.79 (0.89)	0.25	0.46	0.15	--

Sources: Statistical Bureau of China, the People’s Bank of China, Chinese Banking Regulatory Commission; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Bank, Statistical Abstracts of the U.S., the Statistical Bureau of Japan; Ministry of Finance, Korea, the Bank of Korea, Korean Statistical Information System; IMF, World Bank; Bank Indonesia; Ministry of Finance, India; National Statistical Bureau of Taiwan.

Table 3-B Liquidation of NPLs by Four Asset Management Companies (RMB billion)

This table presents results on the liquidation of NPLs by four state-owned asset management companies in China during the period 2001 to the 1st quarter of 2006. These asset management companies were set up to specifically deal with NPLs accumulated in the 'Big Four' state-owned banks.

	Book value of Assets (Accumulated)	Assets Recovered	Cash Recovered	Asset Recovery Rate (%)	Cash Recovery Rate (%)
2001					
Hua Rong	23.21	12.54	7.55	54.0	32.5
Great Wall	53.11	6.30	3.69	11.9	6.9
Oriental	18.29	8.51	4.42	46.5	24.2
Xin Da	29.90	22.50	10.49	75.3	35.1
Total	124.51	49.86	26.15	40.0	21.0
2002					
Hua Rong	32.04	11.43	10.20	35.7	31.8
Great Wall	45.48	7.94	5.47	17.5	12.0
Oriental	22.10	10.60	5.57	47.9	25.2
Xin Da	33.10	17.46	10.51	52.7	31.8
Total	132.73	47.43	31.75	35.7	23.9
2004					
	Accumulated Disposal	Cash Recovered	Disposal Ratio (%)	Asset Recovery Ratio (%)	Cash Recovery Ratio (%)
Hua Rong	209.54	41.34	59.77	25.29	19.73
Great Wall	209.91	21.57	61.91	14.43	10.27
Oriental	104.55	23.29	41.42	29.50	22.27
Xin Da	151.06	50.81	48.90	38.29	33.64
Total	675.06	137.00	53.96	25.48	20.29
2005					
Hua Rong	243.38	54.39	69.17	26.92	22.35
Great Wall	263.39	27.35	77.88	12.90	10.39
Oriental	131.76	32.01	52.08	28.73	24.30
Xin Da	201.21	62.84	63.82	34.30	31.23
Total	839.75	176.60	66.74	24.58	21.03
2006 (Q1)					
Hua Rong	246.80	54.66	70.11	26.50	22.15
Great Wall	270.78	27.83	80.11	12.70	10.28
Oriental	141.99	32.81	56.13	27.16	23.11
Xin Da	206.77	65.26	64.69	34.46	31.56
Total	866.34	180.56	68.61	24.20	20.84

Notes: 1. Accumulated Disposal refers to the accumulated amount of cash and non-cash assets recovered as well as loss incurred by the end of the reporting period.

2. Disposal Ratio = Accumulated Disposal / Total NPLs purchased .

3. Asset Recovery Ratio = Total Assets Recovered / Accumulated Disposal.

4. Cash Recovery Ratio = Cash Recovered / Accumulated Disposal.

Source: Almanac of China's Finance and Banking 2002-2005, and the reports of China Banking Regulatory Commission 2004-2006.

Table 3-C Performance of Chinese Banks' IPOs

This table presents information on the IPOs of three of the Big Four banks and that of Bank of Communications (BComm). ICBC went IPO in both the HKSE (HK dollar) and SHSE (RMB), while PCBC and BComm only listed shares on the HKSE. First day (first week) return is percentage return of closing price of first day (fifth trading day) over offer price. Foreign ownership indicates size of ownership stakes of foreign institutions and investors at the date of IPOs.

	ICBC		BOC		PCBC	BComm
	HKSE (HK\$)	SHSE (RMB)	HKSE (HK\$)	SHSE (RMB)	HKSE (HK\$)	HKSE (HK\$)
IPO Date	10/27/2006	10/27/2006	6/01/2006	7/05/2006	10/27/2005	6/23/2005
Offer Price (per share)	3.07	3.12	2.95	3.08	2.35	2.5
IPO Proceeds (amount)	124.95B	46.64B	82.86B	20.00B	59.94B	14.64B
1 st Day Return	14.66%	5.13%	14.41%	22.73%	0.00%	13.00%
1 st Week Return	16.94%	4.81%	19.49%	19.16%	-1.06%	13.00%
Foreign Ownership	7.28%	--	14.40%	--	14.39%	18.33%

Source: IPO prospectuses submitted to SHSE and HKSE; SHSE and HKSE.

Table 4-A State-owned and Private Banks in China (RMB billion)

Types of Banks	Total Assets	Total Deposits	Outstanding Loans	Profit	NPL rate (%)
2004					
Big Four Banks	16,932.1	14,412.3	10,086.1		15.57
Other Commercial Banks	4,697.2	4,059.9	2,885.9	50.7	4.93
1) Joint Equity					
2) City Commercial Banks	1,693.8	1,434.1	904.5		11.73
Foreign Banks	515.9	126.4	255.8	18.8	1.34
Urban Credit Cooperatives	171.5	154.9	97.9		
Rural Credit Cooperatives	3,101.3	2,734.8	1,974.8	9.65	
2003					
Big Four Banks	16,275.1	13,071.9	9,950.1	196.5	19.74
Other Commercial Banks	3,816.8	3,286.5	2,368.2		7.92
1) Joint Equity					
2) City Commercial Banks	1,465.4	1,174.7	774.4	5.4	14.94
Foreign Banks	333.1	90.7	147.6	18.1	2.87
Urban Credit Cooperatives	148.7	127.1	85.6	0.01	
Rural Credit Cooperatives	2,674.6	2,376.5	1,775.9	4.4	
2002					
Big Four Banks	14,450.0	11,840.0	8,460.0	71.0	26.1
Other Commercial Banks	4,160.0	3,390.0	2,290.0	--	--
1) Joint Equity	2,990.0	--	--	--	9.5
2) City Commercial Banks	1,170.0	--	--	--	17.7
Foreign Banks	324.2	--	154.0	15.2	--
Urban Credit Cooperatives	119.0	101.0	66.4	--	--
Rural Credit Cooperatives	--	1,987.0	1,393.0	--	--
2001					
Big Four Banks	13,000.0	10,770.0	7,400.0	23.0	25.37
Other Commercial Banks	3,259.0	2,530.7	1,649.8	12.9	--
1) Joint Equity	2,386.0	1,849.0	1,224.0	10.5	12.94
2) City Commercial Banks	873.0	681.7	425.8	2.4	--
Foreign Banks	373.4	--	153.2	1.7	--
Urban Credit Cooperatives	128.7	107.1	72.5	2.6	--
Rural Credit Cooperatives	--	1,729.8	1,197.0	--	--

Source: Almanac of China's Finance and Banking 2000-2005.

Table 4-B Comparison of Assets Held by China's Non-Bank Intermediaries (RMB billion)

This table compares *total assets* held by banks and non-bank intermediaries during the period 1995-2004.

Year	State-owned Banks	RCCs	UCCs	Insurance Companies	TICs	Non-deposit Intermediaries	Other Commercial Banks	Foreign Banks
1995	5,373.34	679.10	303.92	--	458.60	48.97	536.91	42.90
1996	6,582.74	870.66	374.78	--	563.70	82.02	769.98	55.30
1997	7,914.41	1,012.20	498.94	--	636.40	100.42	948.61	75.80
1998	8,860.93	1,143.11	560.63	--	802.50	120.97	1,128.18	118.40
1999	9,970.63	1,239.24	630.15	260.41	907.50	137.08	1,376.89	191.40
2000	10,793.73	1,393.06	678.49	337.39	975.90	160.82	1,828.26	379.20
2001	11,188.22	1,610.80	780.02	459.13	1,088.30	223.67	2,255.70	341.80
2002	13,549.60	2,205.21	119.23	649.41	1,544.10	408.10	2,997.72	317.90
2003	16,275.10	2,674.62	148.72	912.28	--	495.58	3,816.80	331.10
2004	16,932.10	3,103.30	171.50	933.41	--	--	4,697.20	515.90

Source: Aggregate Statistics from the People's Bank of China (China's Central Bank), 2000 - 2006.

**Table 5-A China's Bond Markets: 1990 – 2005
(Amount in RMB billion)**

This table presents the development of China's bond markets. "Policy Financial Bonds" are issued by "policy banks," which belong to the Treasury Department, and the proceeds of bond issuance are invested in government run projects and industries such as infrastructure construction (similar to municipal bonds in the U.S.)

Year	Treasury Bonds			Policy Financial Bonds			Corporate Bonds		
	Amount Issued	Redemption Amount	Balance	Amount Issued	Amounts Redemption	Balance	Amounts issued	Amounts Redemption	Balance
1990	19.72	7.62	89.03	6.44	5.01	8.49	12.4	7.73	19.54
1991	28.13	11.16	106.00	6.69	3.37	11.81	24.9	11.43	33.11
1992	46.08	23.81	128.27	5.50	3.00	14.31	68.37	19.28	82.20
1993	38.13	12.33	154.07	0.00	3.43	10.88	23.58	25.55	80.24
1994	113.76	39.19	228.64	0.00	1.35	9.53	16.18	28.20	68.21
1995	151.09	49.70	330.03	--	--	170.85	30.08	33.63	64.66
1996	184.78	78.66	436.14	105.56	25.45	250.96	26.89	31.78	59.77
1997	241.18	126.43	550.89	143.15	31.23	362.88	25.52	21.98	52.10
1998	380.88	206.09	776.57	195.02	32.04	512.11	15.00	10.53	67.69
1999	401.50	123.87	1,054.20	180.09	47.32	644.75	15.82	5.65	77.86
2000	465.70	152.50	1,367.40	164.50	70.92	738.33	8.30	0.00	86.16
2001	488.40	228.60	1,561.80	259.00	143.88	853.45	14.70	0.00	100.86
2002	593.43	226.12	1,933.60	307.50	155.57	1,005.41	32.50	0.00	133.36
2003	628.01	275.58	2,260.36	456.14	250.53	1,165.00	35.80	0.00	169.16
2004	692.39	374.99	2,577.76	414.80	177.87	1,401.93	32.70	0.00	201.86
2005	704.20	104.55	2,877.40	385.17	205.30	1,781.80	204.65	3.70	401.81
Growth Rate	26.90%	19.10%	26.10%	31.40%	28.10%	42.80%	20.40%	-4.80%	22.30%

Source: Aggregate Statistics from the People's Bank of China (China's Central Bank) 2000 – 2006 and the Statistical Yearbook of China 2000-2006.

Table 5-B A Comparison of External (Outside the Firm) Capital Markets (Mean)

This table compares the size of external markets and the strength of investor protection in China versus those in the LLSV (1997) sample countries, sorted by countries' legal origin. Data for LLSV countries are obtained from LLSV (1997), while data on China, as of the end of 2002, is obtained from the Almanac of China's Finance and Banking.

Country	English-origin Average	French-origin Average	German-origin Average	Scandinavian- origin Average	LLSV Sample Average	China (2002)
External capital/GNP	0.6	0.21	0.46	0.3	0.4	0.49 (0.16)
Domestic Firms/Pop	35.45	10	16.79	27.26	21.59	0.93
IPOs/Population	2.23	0.19	0.12	2.14	1.02	0.05
Total Debt/GNP	0.68	0.45	0.97	0.57	0.59	0.35
GDP growth (one-year)	4.3	3.18	5.29	2.42	3.79	6.77
Rule of Law	6.46	6.05	8.68	10	6.85	5
Anti-director Rights	3.39	1.76	2	2.5	2.44	3
One share = one vote	0.22	0.24	0.33	0	0.22	1
Creditor rights	3.11	1.58	2.33	2	2.3	2

Sources: LLSV (1997a) paper; Almanac of China's Finance and Banking (2003), the 1986 trial version of China's Bankruptcy Law, and the 1999 Company Law.

Table 6-A Types of Common Stock Issued in China

Tradable?		Definition
No (Private block transfer possible)	State-owned shares* (G shares after reform that are tradable)	Shares that are controlled by the central government during the process in which firms are converted into a limited liability corporation but before being listed. These shares are either managed and represented by the Bureau of National Assets Management or held by other state-owned companies. Both types of organizations also appoint board members on firms' boards. After reforms announced in 2005 and implemented in 2006-7 state shares became G shares and are tradable.
	Entrepreneur's shares	Shares reserved for firms' founders during the same process described above; different from shares that founders can purchase and sell in the markets.
	Foreign owners	Shares owned by foreign industrial investors during the same process
	Legal entity holders	Shares sold to legal identities (such as other companies, listed or non-listed) during the same process.
	Employee shares	Shares sold to firm's employees during the same process.
Yes (Newly issued shares)	A Shares	Shares issued by Chinese companies that are listed and traded in the Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchange; most of these shares are sold to and held by Chinese (citizen) investors.
	B Shares	Shares issued by Chinese companies that are listed and traded in the Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchange; these shares are sold to and held by foreign investors; starting 2001 Chinese investors can also trade these shares.
	H Shares	Shares issued by selected Chinese companies listed and traded in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange; these shares can only be traded on the HK Exchange but can be held by anyone.

*: There are sub-categories under this definition

Table 6-B Tradable vs. Non-tradable Shares for China's Listed Companies

Year	State/total shares	Non-tradable [^] /total shares	Tradable/total shares	A/total shares	A/Tradable shares [*]
1992	0.41	0.69	0.31	0.16	0.52
1993	0.49	0.72	0.28	0.16	0.57
1994	0.43	0.67	0.33	0.21	0.64
1995	0.39	0.64	0.36	0.21	0.60
1996	0.35	0.65	0.35	0.22	0.62
1997	0.32	0.65	0.35	0.23	0.66
1998	0.34	0.66	0.34	0.24	0.71
1999	0.36	0.65	0.35	0.26	0.75
2000	0.39	0.64	0.36	0.28	0.80
2001	0.39	0.64	0.36	0.29	0.80
2002	N/a	0.65	0.35	0.26	0.74
2003	N/a	0.64	0.35	0.27	0.76
2004	N/a	0.64	0.36	0.28	0.77
2005	N/a	0.62	0.38	0.30	0.78
2006 (June)	N/a	0.57	0.43	0.35	0.81

[^]: Non-tradable shares include “state-owned” and “shares owned by legal entities”;

^{*}: tradable shares include A, B, and H shares;

Source: China Security Regulation Committee Reports (2000-2006) and <http://www.csrc.gov.cn>

Table 6-C Ownership and Control in the Listed Firms of China

Company Ownership and Control (%)		
Shareholder type	Ownership	Control (board seats)
State	24	21
Legal person	44	48
Employees	2	3
Tradable Shares	30	4
Total	100	76


Source: Table 4.6 p.83, “Corporate Governance and Enterprise Reform in China, Building the institutions of Modern Market,” 2002, World Bank publication.

Table 7 Trading Volume of National Interbank Market (RMB billion)

Maturity	Overnight	7 days	20 days	30 days	60 days	90 days	120 days
2001	103.88	560.69	93.35	35.28	9.40	4.73	0.87
2002	1,059.33	2,086.47	77.69	56.29	13.28	15.45	3.94
2003	641.89	1,456.31	56.60	44.11	10.14	10.18	2.81
2004	641.89	1,456.31	56.60	44.11	10.14	10.18	2.81
2005	223.03	896.26	60.42	29.91	7.51	14.09	1.54
2006 (Jan.-Sept.)	376.51	842.28	30.79	14.29	10.05	2..31	0.90

Source: China Interbank Market Annual Reports (1999-2006).

Figure 1 Overview of China's Financial System






Figure 2-A. Financing sources for the Listed Sector




Figure 2-B. Financing sources for the State Sector




Figure 2-C. Financing sources for the Hybrid Sector

Figures 2-A, 2-B, and 2-C examine financing sources (for the investment of fixed assets) of different types of firms in China. In all three figures, each of the four connected lines represents the importance of a particular financing channel over the time period 1994 to 2002, measured by the percentage of firms' total financing coming from this channel. Figure 2-A presents financing sources for firms in the Listed Sector, Figure 2-B presents results for firms in the State Sector, while Figure 2-C presents results for firms in the Hybrid Sector.

Components of Bank deposits




Figure 3-A Sources for Bank Deposits in China

Bank Credit/GNP




Figure 3-B Comparing Total Bank Credit




Figure 3-C A Comparison of Assets Under Management of Insurance Companies




Figure 4 A Comparison of Performance of Stock Indexes (1992-2006 Nov.)




Figure 5 A Comparison of Financial Markets in 2003

Sources: Based on figures in Allen et al. (2004). Direct sources include International Financial Statistics, International Federation of Stock Exchanges, Japan Securities Dealers Association, IFC Bond Database, Thai Bond Dealing Centre, Thomson Financial, CEIC and various central banks, ECB. Statistical Year Book of China 2003, 2004.

- Notes:
- a). Bank loans are domestic credit extended to the Hybrid Sector in China and to the private sector in all other countries. All bank loan data, except Taiwan, are reported in line 32d in the International Financial Statistics (September 2003);
 - b) All outstanding bond data are as of end-2003, except for Japan and Singapore (end-2002 for 2003), Indonesia (end-2000 for 2003) and the Philippines (end-1999 for 2003).
 - c) Bond figures for Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan are from central banks. Figures for Indonesia and the Philippines are from IFC Emerging Markets Information Centre Bond Database. Figures for Thailand are from Thai Bond Dealing Centre. Figures for Singapore are estimates based on data from MAS and Thomson Financial;
 - d) Public sector refers to government bodies and quasi-government entities; Private sector refers to non-public sector and includes financial institutions, corporations and overseas institutions;
 - e) Bank loans (total amount and percentage of GDP) in the euro area refer to end-2002 for 2003;
 - f) Euro Area includes: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain; Non-Japan Asia includes: Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines, and Thailand.




Figure 6-A: Market cap./GNP ratios




Figure 6-B: GDP growth rates




Figure 6-C: Corporate bond market




Figure 6-D: Equity Issuance

Figure 6-A compares the time series of stock market capitalization/GDP ratios across six emerging economies. Figure 6-B compares time series of the growth rates of GDP, and the growth rates are calculated using PPP-adjusted GDP figures in order to avoid biases caused by different currency policies. Figure 6-C presents the time series of the ratios of the amount of corporate bonds outstanding /GNP, while Figure 6-D presents the time series of IPO and SEO (in a given year)/GDP. The calculations for all the ratios in Figures 6-A, 6-C, and 6-D are based on local currencies of a country in a given year.

Industrial Output by Sectors




Figure 7-A Comparing the Sectors – Industrial Output

In this figure we plot total “industrial output” for State (SOEs) and Listed (publicly listed and traded firms) Sectors combined and for the Hybrid Sector (all the rest of the firms) during 1990 to 2004. Data source for this table is the Chinese Statistical Yearbook (1998 – 2006).

Employment by Sectors




Figure 7-B Comparing the Sectors – Employment

In this figure we plot total number of workers employed by the State (SOEs) and Listed (publicly listed and traded firms) Sectors combined and by the Hybrid Sector (all the rest of the firms) during 1990 to 2005. Data source for this table is the Chinese Statistical Yearbook (1998 – 2006).