

Discussion: "Optimal Design of Tokenized Markets" Michael Lee, Antoine Martin, & Dmitriy Muravyev


Chaojun Wang
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania

IMF Annual Macro-Financial Research Conference April 2025





















Tokenization ≡ Instant Settlement

Tokenization ≡ Instant Settlement

Companion paper Zero settlement risk token system ← Instant settlement

This paper Proposition 4 (p.34): State-contingent programs reintroduce settlement risk

Move to Proposition 0?

Fundamental tension between settlement risk and holdup

- Remove settlement risk requires immediate settlement
- Immediate settlement worsens holdup

Fundamental tension between settlement risk and holdup


- Remove settlement risk requires immediate settlement
- Immediate settlement worsens holdup
- Legacy system: Maximum settlement risk & minimum holdup
- Zero-settlement-risk token system: Minimum settlement risk & maximum holdup


Fundamental tension between settlement risk and holdup


- Remove settlement risk requires immediate settlement
- Immediate settlement worsens holdup
- Legacy system: Maximum settlement risk & minimum holdup
- Zero-settlement-risk token system: Minimum settlement risk & maximum holdup
- Optimal balance between settlement risk & holdup?
 - ► Legacy system: penalty for settlement failure
 - ► Token system: varying degree of state contingency














- Zero settlement risk: no trades occur in the worst case scenario
- Doesn't worsen holdup relative to the legacy system

Summary

Conceptually deep paper

Main suggestions:

- Emphasize the fundamental tension between settlement risk & holdup
- Rule out match making as an joint solution to settlement risk & holdup